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sonality traits, as measured by the so-called “big five” traits. The model is estimated using the HILDA
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and occupation choices over the lifecycle. Results show that individuals with a comparative advantage
in schooling and white-collar work have, on average, higher cognitive skills and higher personality trait
scores. Allowing personality traits to evolve with age and with schooling proves to be important to cap-
turing the heterogeneity in how people respond to educational policies. The estimated model is used to
evaluate two education policies: compulsory senior secondary school and a 50% college tuition subsidy.
Both policies are effective in increasing educational attainment. They also affect personality traits.
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1 Introduction
Cognitive skills are known to be important determinants of labor market success, but there is increasing
evidence that noncognitive skills also play a salient role (Becker (1964); Griliches (1977)). For example, using
data from the Perry Preschool randomized experiment, Heckman et al. (2010) find that the ability to plan
and to exert self-control significantly affects lifetime earnings and employment. Devising social policies that
maximize the potential for human development requires an understanding of how cognitive and noncognitive
skills jointly evolve and influence individuals’ education and labor market trajectories.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of schooling, work, and occupational choices that in-
corporates both cognitive and noncognitive skills, where the latter are measured by the “big five” personality
traits. Our model allows both cognitive and noncognitive traits to influence educational and labor market
outcomes, by affecting pecuniary or nonpecuniary returns from schooling and by affecting the reward from
choosing different occupational sectors. Our analysis is inspired in part by the pioneering work of Keane and
Wolpin (1997) that estimates a similar dynamic discrete choice model without personality traits.
A key finding of Keane and Wolpin (1997) is that 90 percent of the total variance in expected lifetime
utility is explained by unobserved skill endowments at age 16. Other studies also emphasize the importance
of unobserved endowment heterogeneity. For example, Yamaguchi (2012) finds that endowment differences
prior to labor market entry account for 70% of the log-wage variance in the first year and 35% after 20 years.
Sullivan (2010) finds that 56% of the variance in discounted expected lifetime utility is explained by initial
heterogeneity. Huggett et al. (2011) conclude that 61.5% of the variation in lifetime earnings and 64% of the
variation in lifetime utility are attributable to initial conditions.
Although accumulated evidence shows that endowment heterogeneity is important in explaining educa-
tional and labor market outcomes, its precise components remain unclear. Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that
family background accounts for less than 10 percent of the total variation in lifetime utility and that adding
cognitive ability as an initial condition only increases the explained variation to 14 percent. Prior studies
have not considered the potential role of personality traits as a component of endowment heterogeneity,
because the datasets typically used in estimation do not include personality trait measurements.
In the psychology literature, personality traits have been shown to be correlated with many aspects of
individuals’ lives, but study of their effects on economic outcomes is relatively scarce (e.g. Almlund et al.
(2011)). The five-factor model (so called “big-five”) is the most widely adopted measurement of personality
in psychology (Goldberg (1992);Saucier (1994);Gosling et al. (2003)). The big five traits include openness
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism (OCEAN). Below we describe
the meaning of these traits and their determination.
In economics, some studies consider the role of the “big-five" in explaining wage, employment, education
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and marriage outcomes. However, none of these studies introduce personality traits within a life-cycle
framework in which these outcomes are jointly determined. Also, in the literature, the few dynamic models
that incorporate noncognitive traits usually represent traits using a single factor rather than multidimensional
measures.1.
The goals of this paper are: (i) to incorporate the "big-five" personality traits within a dynamic life-
cycle framework model of education and employment choices (ii) to explore the role of personality traits as
determinants of unobserved heterogeneity, and (iii) to use the estimated model to evaluate the distributional
effects of two kinds of educational policies. To this end, we develop and estimate a dynamic model of
schooling, work and occupational choices that assumes that individuals ages 15 to 50 make one of four
mutually exclusive choices: attending school, staying home, working in a white-collar job or working in a
blue-collar job. After age 50 individuals are assumed to stay in their most recent sector choice until retirement
(age 65) to ease the computational burden. Individual endowments at age 15 consist of personality traits,
cognitive ability, and family background characteristics, which include parental schooling, number of siblings,
sibling order and whether the person lived with both parents at age 14. To allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in a tractable way, we assume each individual is one of four types (denoted I-IV). An individual’s type can
affect their pecuniary and nonpecuniary reward from choosing particular schooling or work options.
We incorporate the “big five" personality traits into the model in a parsimonious way as a determinant of
the unobserved type probabilities. Personality traits are observed to change with age and to be affected by
school attendance. We therefore allow an individual’s unobserved type to potentially vary over time. In the
dynamic discrete choice literature, the standard approach is to assume fixed types (e.g. Keane and Wolpin
(1997), Yamaguchi (2012), Sullivan (2010)). However, recent methodological papers by Hu et al. (2015) and
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) consider the use of time-varying types that follow a Markov process that is
similar to our specification. We perform a Wald test for type stability, which is rejected in our data.2.
Our model is estimated using Simulated Method of Moments and using the Household Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) longitudinal data, waves 1(2001) through 13(2013). The data have repeated
measures of personality traits as well as one-time measure of cognitive ability. The estimation results show
that the unobserved types are malleable, particularly at early ages. At age 15, individuals have on average
a 75% probability to change type, but by age 30 their type stabilizes.3
We use the estimated model to evaluate two education policies: making senior secondary school com-
pulsory and providing a 50% cost subsidy to attend college. Both policies provide incentives to enroll in
school but they differ in their distributional implications. We find that individuals belonging to types I
1e.g. Borghans et al. (2008)
2To our knowledge, varying-type models have only been considered from a theoretical perspective and have not yet been
implemented in a dynamic discrete choice context
3Our results are broadly consistent some psychology studies on personality trait stability. For example, Terracciano et al.
(2006) and Terracciano et al. (2010) report that intra-individual stability increases up to age 30 and thereafter stabilizes.
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and IV, who tend to come from more advantaged SES backgrounds, have a comparative advantage in the
schooling sector and receive the most benefit from the college subsidy policy. Their average number of years
of completed education increases by almost one year. However, types II and III, who on average come from
lower SES backgrounds, also experience significant benefits from the tuition subsidy in terms of increased
education, earnings and utility. In contrast, the impacts of compulsory senior second school are concentrated
only among individuals from lower SES backgrounds (types II and III).
To study the relevance of time-varying heterogeneity and personality traits in assessing educational policy
impacts, we also simulate policy effects under an assumption that the types are fixed, in the spirit of Keane
and Wolpin (1997). In such a model, there is less incentive for disadvantaged groups to pursue education,
because they can no longer alter their disadvantaged types. The increase in annual earnings and the effect
on educational attainment attributable to the educational policies are significantly smaller in the fixed type
model and the distribution of policy impacts is more unequal.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews related literature. Section III describes the HILDA
data and the big five measures. Section IV describes the model. Section V discusses the identification
strategy and section VI explains the estimation strategy. Section VII presents the estimation results and
provides evidence on model fit. Section VIII explores the relationship between personality traits, types and
choices, evaluating the importance of personality traits in explaining the ex-ante utility, and also performs
a test for the type stability. Section IX reports results from simulating two policy experiments and section
X concludes.
2 Related Literature
The “big five” personality traits are defined as follows: (1) extraversion: an orientation of one’s interests and
energies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience;
characterized by positive affect and sociability, (2) neuroticism: a chronic level of emotional instability and
proneness to psychological distress, (3) openness to experience/intellect: the tendency to be open to new
esthetic, cultural, or intellectual experiences, (4) conscientiousness: the tendency to be organized, responsible,
and hardworking and (5) agreeableness: the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner.
Several studies examine the influence of personality traits on wage performance and occupational choices.
For example, both Nyhus and Pons (2005) and Salgado (1997) find that emotional stability and conscien-
tiousness are strongly correlated with wage and job performance. Cubel et al. (2016) examine whether big
five personality traits affect productivity using data gathered in a laboratory setting where the task effort
is directly measured. They find that individuals who exhibit high levels of conscientiousness and higher
emotional stability perform better on the task. Fletcher (2013) uses data on siblings and finds a robust
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relationship between personality traits and wages using sibling samples. Specifically, conscientiousness, emo-
tional stability, extraversion and openness to experience were all found to positively affect wages. There are a
few papers that examine the correlation between personality traits and educational attainment. For example,
Lundberg (2013) finds positive correlations between personality traits (such as conscientiousness, agreeable-
ness and openness to experience) and college entrance. Dahmann and Anger (2014), Kassenboehmer et al.
(2018) and Schurer (2017) argue that educational experiences in secondary school and at university shape
students’ personalities.
Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature examining the process of non-cognitive skill for-
mation. Heckman et al. (2006) study the effect of non-cognitive skills on schooling decisions and subse-
quent labour market outcomes. Cunha and Heckman (2007) find the dynamic complementarity and self-
productivity are key features that generate multiplier effects in the production of human capital during
childhood. Cunha and Heckman (2008) estimate a linear dynamic model to study the formation of cognitive
and non-cognitive skill as it depends on parental investment. Cunha et al. (2010) extends the linear pro-
duction technology assumption to a nonlinear setting, which allows identification of elasticity of substitution
parameters governing the trade-off between early and late investments. Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016) con-
sider ways of further relaxing some of the identification assumptions in Cunha et al. (2010). Mullins (2016)
develops and estimates a model of children’s cognitive and behavioral skill development that he uses to
evaluate the impact of government antipoverty programs. Heckman and Raut (2016) formulate a dynamic
structural model that relates preschool investment choices that affect skill formation with schooling and
earning outcomes later in life.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on a sample of individuals from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA) longitudinal data set. HILDA is a representative one in one thousand sample of the
Australian population. It is an ongoing annual survey starting from the year 2001 with 19,914 initial
individuals from 7,682 households. (Summerfield et al. (2014)) We make use of the following variables: (1)
labor market outcomes including occupational information (coded following the ANZSCO system4), annual
labor earnings and working hours; (2) family background information including parental education levels,
sibling number and order as well as measures of household intactness; (3) education levels ranging from
senior secondary school until the highest degree; (4) cognitive ability measured in wave 12; and (5) the “big
4In practice, we classify all occupations into two categories: blue-collar job and white-collar job. White collar jobs includes
managers, professionals, technicians and tradesperson as well as clerical and administrative workers. Blue collar jobs include
community and personal service workers, sales workers, machinery operators and drivers as well as labourers. See table 1 for
details.
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five” personality traits assessment repeatedly collected in wave 5, 9 and 13.
To the best of our knowledge, HILDA has the best quality measures of personality traits among all
nationwide data sets. For the majority of respondents, we observe three repeated measurements of personality
traits over an eight-years time window.5 HILDA’s “big five” information is based on 36 personality questions
(shown in Table 2). Respondents were asked to pick a number between 1 to 7 to assess how well each
personality adjective describes them. The lowest number 1 denotes a total opposite description and the
highest number 7 denotes a perfect description. According to Losoncz (2009), 28 of the 36 items load well
onto five components when performing factor analysis. The other 8 items are discarded due to either their
low loading value or their ambiguity on several traits. We construct “big five” measures using the average
scores of the items belonging to each personality component. 6
The big five personality traits are available for 4,938 males interviewed in wave 5 and for 5,048 and 6,771
male respondents in waves 9 and 13. We include in our analysis individuals who have at least one measure
of personality traits.
Cognitive ability is only surveyed once in wave 12.7 We construct a one-dimensional measure of cognitive
ability from three different measurements: (i) Backward Digits Span, (ii) Symbol Digits Modalities and (iii)
a 25-item version of the National Adult Reading Test. Specifically, we rescale the three cognitive ability task
scores to be mean 0 and variance 1. Then the one-dimensional cognitive ability is the average value of these
three measurements.
3.1 Additional background variables and sample restrictions
In addition to the cognitive and noncognitive trait measures, we use the following family background infor-
mation in our analysis: sibling information (including whether the person has siblings, whether he is the
eldest child in the family and how many siblings), an indicator of growing up in an intact family, parental
education, and parental working status.8 We also use state of residence.
Our estimation focuses on males age 15-44. Women are not included to avoid the complication of modeling
fertility, which likely impacts schooling and labor supply decisions. Individuals serving in the military are also
excluded. Lastly, we drop person-year observations with missing information for key state space variables in
5One alternative national-wide data set providing personality traits inventory assessment is German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) study. GSOEP also surveys “big five” three times in years 2005, 2009 and 2013.
6More specifically, openness to experience is constructed from average scores on six adjective items including imaginative,
creative, intellectual, philosophical, deep and complex. Conscientiousness is constructed from average scores on six adjective
items including orderly, disorganised, efficient, sloppy, inefficient and systematic. Extraversion is constructed from average
scores on six adjective items including quiet, shy, talkative, extroverted, bashful and lively. Agreeableness is constructed from
average scores on four items including warm, kind, sympathetic and cooperative. Lastly, emotional stability is constructed
from average scores on six items including moody, temperamental, jealous, fretful, envious and touchy. We verify the internal
construct reliability by examining the most widely index - Cronbach’s alpha. All traits show relatively high internal consistency
(α > 0.7) in all waves 5, 9 and 13. .
7According to Wooden (2013), the response rate is high, approximately 93%.
8All the parental questions pertain to when the respondent was age 14.
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our model. The remaining sample has 36,639 total observations from 4,215 individuals.
Selected summary statistics of individual’s characteristics are reported in table 3. Our sample is dis-
tributed across eight states and territories. Most individuals (>95%) have siblings. Approximately one-third
are the eldest child. Table 3 also provides statistics on parental education and occupations at the time the
individual was age 14. Almost two-thirds of fathers have a college degree while only half of mothers have a
college degree. Most fathers were employed (>95%), but only about two-thirds of the sample had working
mothers (64%). The majority of fathers’ jobs were in white-collar occupations (72%), in comparison to 53%
of working mothers. The majority of individuals (80%) report residing with both parents at the age of 14.
3.2 Education and occupation choices over the life cycle
In the HILDA survey, individuals report school enrollment and employment information annually.9 The
employment information includes employment status, working hours, total annual earnings and occupational
codes. Figure 1 shows the choice distribution of schooling, staying at home, blue collar jobs and white collar
jobs by age. At age 15, almost everyone is enrolled in school but after age 19, the fraction drops sharply
to around 35%. The majority of secondary school graduates choose to work immediately rather than to
continue their tertiary education. The school enrollment rate keeps decreasing from 20% at age 23 to around
3% at age 27.
We define an individual to be “working" if reported to be working positive hours and not enrolled in
school.10 An individual is defined to be “staying home" if neither working nor in school.11 The blue-collar
participation rate increases to around 30% at age 18 and then stabilizes at around 40%. The increase in
the white-collar participation rate seen between ages 22 to 25 suggests that a college degree is a prerequisite
for many white-collar occupations. The white collar participation rate continues to increase after age 26,
as some workers switch from blue-collar job to white-collar jobs. The percentage staying home increasing
shortly after graduation from secondary school graduation and then declines to roughly 5%.
Figure 2 reports the age-earnings profile by blue collar or white collar occupations between ages 18 to
44.12. Both the white-collar and blue-collar earnings profiles exhibit a concave increase, overall. Prior to
age 24, earnings of white-collar and blue-collar workers are similar. Subsequently, however, the shape of the
blue-collar earnings profile becomes flatter and then stops growing (after age 28). The white-collar earnings
9A rough classification of the tertiary education certificates includes 1. Certificates I-IV; 2. Diploma, Advanced Diploma,
Associate Degree; 3. Bachelor degree and honors; 4. Graduate Certificate and Graduate Diploma; 5. Master degree; 6. Doctoral
degree.
10A small fraction of individuals report working and attending school simultaneously. When it happens, we record an
individual as in school if his age is less than 25 and as at work if his age is greater or equal than 25.
11We do not distinguish between being unemployed and out of labor force, as the decision to be unemployed is always
considered voluntary under our model.
12We do not include wage observations between age 15 and age 17, because a large fraction of this age group attends school
and works part-time
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profile keeps increasing. Peak average earnings from blue-collar jobs is around AU$58,000, whereas the peak
from white-collar jobs is much higher, around AU$99,000.
Data on personality traits were gathered in 2005, 2009 and 2013. Table 4 reports the average personality
trait scores for three different educational levels: senior secondary school or lower, college dropouts and college
graduates. College graduates have higher average scores on emotional stability, openness to experience,
conscientiousness, and agreeableness. However, they tend to be less extraverted.
Table 5 reports the difference in personality traits between white-collar and blue-collar workers. White-
collar workers have higher average scores on emotional stability, openness to experience, conscientious, and
agreeableness. The greatest differences in scores by occupation sector are seen in conscientiousness and
openness to experience.
3.3 Stability of personality traits
The stability of personality traits is an important issue discussed both in the psychology and economics lit-
erature. Some studies find that personality traits are stable for adults (Terracciano et al. (2006), Terracciano
et al. (2010)) and Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012). Other studies find that personality traits change with age,
particularly during younger ages (Almlund et al. (2011), Cunha and Heckman (2007), Cunha et al. (2010)).
In this section, we use the HILDA data to examine the malleability of personality traits. Figures 3(a) to
3(e) show the average score on the “big five” over the life cycle using the 2013 data wave. Compared with
the other traits, conscientiousness is the only personality trait that exhibits a significant increase with age.
Changes in openness to experience, agreeableness and emotional stability are moderate and not statistically
distinguishable from 0. Extraversion decreases with age until age 35 and then stays stable. Our findings are
consistent with patterns described in Elkins et al. (2017). They find that conscientiousness increases with
age by 0.38 standard deviations, but the changes in other personality traits are moderate and do not exceed
0.15 standard deviations.
3.4 Personality traits, schooling and occupation sector
We now investigate in Table 6 how working and schooling correlate with observed changes in personality.
After standardizing the scores to each have mean 0 and variance 1, we estimate fixed effects models of
personality traits regressed on education, age, age squared, age interacted with education and indicators
for whether the individual is in a white or blue collar occupation. Each column of Table 6 reports the
estimated coefficients for a different trait. The coefficients associated with age and education are statistically
significantly different from zero for three out of the five traits (openness, conscientiousness and emotional
stability), indicating that personality traits vary with age and with schooling. The estimated coefficients
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imply that the marginal effects of education on personality traits are greatest at younger ages and then
diminish with age. 13 Occupational sector does not have any systematic relationship with personality traits.
Table 7 shows the relationship between log earnings, personality traits and cognitive ability. The speci-
fication is analogous to a Mincer log earnings regression (estimated for individuals with positive earnings).
The first column presents estimates where the included variables are education, potential experience and
potential experience-squared.14 The so-called "rate of return" to education is around 11%.15 The second
column adds personality traits to the specification. All of the traits have associated coefficients that are sta-
tistically different from zero. The most important trait associated with higher earnings is conscientiousness.
Three of the traits (openness, emotional stability, and agreeableness) have, ceteris paribus, negative effects
on earnings. The regression also includes cognitive ability (standardized to have mean zero and variance
1). Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability increases earnings by 7-8 percent,
an effect that is comparable in magnitude to the effect of conscientiousness. The third column adds to
the specification a set of family background variables as additional control variables (described in the table
notes). The estimated coefficients on all the variables change little when the family background variables
are added, although the overall R-squared increases.
4 The Model
We develop a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) model of decision-making with regard to edu-
cation, employment, and occupation sector between ages 15 to 44. At each age, individuals maximize their
remaining discounted lifetime utility. The terminal age is 65 but to facilitate computation, we assume that
individuals make choices until age 44 and then stay in their age 44 sector choice from ages 45-65. The choice
set in each year consists of four mutually exclusive options m ∈M : working in either a blue- or white-collar
occupation, attending school, or staying home. Let dm(a) = 1 if alternative m is chosen at age a, dm(a) = 0
otherwise.
Individual endowments at age 15 consist of personality traits, cognitive ability, and family background
characteristics. These include parental schooling, the number of siblings, sibling order and whether the
person lived with both parents at age 14. To allow for unobservable heterogeneity in a tractable way, we
assume each individual is one of four types k(a) = {1, 2, 3, 4}. An individual’s type can affect their pecuniary
and nonpecuniary reward from choosing particular alternatives. As noted in the introduction, one important
13For example, the marginal effect of education on openness to experience is 0.076 (0.150-0.493*15/100) at age 15 then
decreases to 0.002 (0.150-0.493*30/100) at age 30. The marginal effect of education on emotional stability decreases from
-0.056 (-0.147+0.609*15/100) at age 15 to 0.005 (-0.147+0.609*25/100) at age 25. The results are consistent with the findings
reported in the literature that personality traits are less malleable at older ages. (see e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2008),Cunha
and Heckman (2009).
14Potential experience is defined as age - years of education - 6
15It is relatively high, in part because the sample is restricted to individuals age 17-44. The estimated rate of return is lower
when older age individuals are included.
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aspect of our model that deviates from most of the literature (e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997)) is that it allows
types to evolve over time in a way that may depend on age and changing personality traits.16
We use Θ(a) to represent personality traits and k(a) to denote the unobserved type at age a, assumed to
be known by the individual but not by econometricians. so(a) represents all other observed state variables.
At age 15, the initial type k(15) is determined by the initial endowment so(15). Then given the initial type
k(15) and observed state variables so(15), the agent chooses the alternative dm(a) that gives the highest
continuation value. The state variables, so(16), are updated according to the choice dm(15), and then the
new type k(16) is drawn with type probabilities depending on so(16) and the previous period type k(15).
4.1 Laws of motion for so(a) and k(a)
The time-varying part of so(a) consists of four components so that so(a) = (g(a), x1(a), x2(a),Θ(a)). g(a)
represents accumulated education while x1(a) and x2(a) represent accumulated blue-collar and white-collar
experience at age a. We first specify the law of motion for states g(a), x1(a), x2(a) and then discuss the
transition probability functions governing the personality traits Θ(a) and types k(a).
Years of schooling and occupation-specific experience evolve in a deterministic way. The updating of
g(a), x1(a) and x2(a) are defined as follows:
g(a) : g(a+ 1) = g(a) + d3(a)
xm(a) : xm(a+ 1) = xm(a) + dm(a),m = {1, 2}
(1)
We assume that the true n− th personality trait θn ∈ Θ, {n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is measured with error and denote
the measurement error shock as ζn(a). In section 3.3, we reported estimates for a fixed effect model that
suggested that personality traits change with schooling. We therefore adopt the following specification for
the evolution of each trait:
θMn (a) = θn(a) + ζn(a)
θn(a) = θn(15) + γ0n + γ1ng(a) + γ2n(a− 15)g(a) + γ3n(a− 15) + γ4n(a− 15)2
(2)
where θMn (a) is the measure of the nth personality trait at age a and θn(a) is the true trait without mea-
surement error. γ3n and γ4n capture age effects. The term γ1n + γ2n(a− 15) captures the potential effect of
education on personality traits, which may again vary by age.
As previously noted, we allow the unobserved types to change in a way that may depend on age and on
personality. We specify a Markov process for the evolution of the discrete types. After the initial period, the
16Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and Hu et al. (2015) discuss conditions needed to identify models with time-varying types.
They are further described below.
10
type k(a) can stay the same with probability 1 − p(a) or change with probability p(a).17 Conditional on a
type changing, we use notation qk(a) to represent the probability of becoming type k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let L(a)
denote the Markov transition matrix of types between period a to period a+1. The matrix has the following
form:
L(a) = (1− p(a))

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
+ p(a)

qk=1(a) qk=1(a) qk=1(a) qk=1(a)
qk=2(a) qk=2(a) qk=2(a) qk=2(a)
qk=3(a) qk=3(a) qk=3(a) qk=3(a)
qk=4(a) qk=4(a) qk=4(a) qk=4(a)
 (3)
where
p(a) = 11 + exp(γ7 + γ8(a− 15) + γ9(a− 15)2) (4)
qk(a) =
v¯ak(Θ, dz)∑K=4
k=1 v¯
a
k(Θ, dz)
(5)
log vak(Θ, dz) = log v¯ak(Θ, dz) + ηk(a)
= γ3k +
∑N=5
n=1 γ4knθn(a) +
∑Z
z=1 γ5zkdz + ηk(a)
(6)
At age 15, the initial types are directly drawn from the distribution qk(15). In subsequent ages, types are
updated following the Markov transition matrix L(a). When p(a) is close to 0, then L(a) corresponds to
an identity matrix I4×4 and the types, k, are fixed. When p(a) = 1, types do not persist from previous
period. We estimate p(a), allowing for the possibility that types become more or less persistent with age.
The probability of each type qk(a) follows a multinomial logit form (equation 5). Equation 6 shows how the
type probability may depend on personality traits θn(a) and background characteristics dz(a).18
4.2 Rewards associated with each alternative
An individual can choose to work in either a blue-collar occupation or a white-collar occupation. The reward
to a particular sector include the wage compensation wm(a) and any non-pecuniary reward rm(a). m(a)
is the preference shock when choosing m − th alternative. m = 1 denotes the blue-collar and m = 2 the
white-collar alternative. This yields the following utility function at age a:
um(a) = wm(a) + rm(a) + m(a),m = {1, 2} (7)
As in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the wage is specified as a human capital pricing equation. It is given by the
product of the price per unit of human capital pm and the amount of human capital em(a) embodied in the
17We assume the probability of changing types p(a) depends on age but does not vary by type k
18The family background information includes sibling numbers, birth order and parental education level.
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individual. That is wm(a) = pmem(a). Human capital is determined by work experience xm(a), schooling
years g(a) as well as time-invariant cognitive ability c:19
em(a) = exp(ekm +
I∑
i=1
βm0idi + βm1g(a) + (βm2 + βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2})xm(a)
+ βm4x3−m(a) + βm5x2m(a) + βm6xm(a)g(a) + βm7c+ ξm(a)),m = {1, 2}
(8)
which yields a log-wage equation the form:
logwm(a) = log pm + ekm +
I∑
i=1
βm0idi + βm1g(a) + (βm2 + βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2})xm(a)
+ βm4x3−m(a) + βm5x2m(a) + βm6xm(a)g(a) + βm7c+ ξm(a),m = {1, 2}
(9)
In (9), di, i ∈ {state × cohort} is a fixed effect for being a member of particular age cohort and residing
in a particular state. ekm is the type-specific component of reward, which represents the advantage or
disadvantage of type k when choosing alternativem. g(a) represents the years of schooling and xm(a) denotes
work experience in sector m. The component βm3I{xm(a) ≤ 2}xm(a) captures a potential differential in
returns to experience when the agent is new in an occupation (has two years or less experience). x3−m(a)
represents working experience in the other sector 3−m. Therefore, the coefficient βm4 captures the return
to other sector work experience. The component βm6xm(a)g(a) captures the interaction term between work
experience xm(a) and education g(a), which is included to allow returns to experience to differ with education.
The component βm7c captures the return to cognitive abilities. ξm(a) is a skill technology shock, which is
assumed to be i.i.d. normal distribution. The second term in equation (7), rm(a), represents nonpecuniary
aspects of choosing a certain occupation (such as working hours flexibility) expressed in monetary equivalent
units. For the purpose of identification, we normalize the nonpecuniary utility from white-collar job r1(a)
equal to 0. We allow the non-pecuniary utility from the blue-collar sector r2(a) to vary with education level.
r1(a) = 0
r2(a) = β8 + β9I[g(a) ≤ 12]
(10)
If a person chooses to attend school, the per-period utility consists of two parts: a nonpecuniary component,
which may reflect any physical and mental costs when attending school, and a pecuniary component, such
as tuition costs and fees.
19Cognitive ability was only measured in one wave of the data, so we do not attempt to model its dynamics over time
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The utility associated with school attendance at age a is:
u3(a) = ek3 +
R∑
r=1
αrdr + αcc+ α0I(age < 18)− α1I(college)
− α2I(graduate) + 3(a)
(11)
dr is a cohort-specific effect, and c is the effect of cognitive ability on the education choice. The term
α0I(age < 18) captures the extra utility of attending school when the agent is under the age 18. α1 and
α2 are per period schooling costs of attending college and attending graduate school. Lastly, ek3 is the
type-specific reward from attending school.
The reward from staying home, u4(a), consists of the type-specific component ek4 , an age effect and an
age squared effect, α3 and α4, and a preference shock 4(a), i.e.:
u4(a) = ek4 + α3 · age+ α4 · age2 + 4(a) (12)
Personality traits do not directly appear in the choice-specific utilities. Instead, they affect the choices
indirectly through their influence on an individual’s type probability.20 Different types have different type-
specific components ekm for each choice m.
4.3 Information structure
In our model, individual heterogeneity comes from two sources: ex-ante endowments {k(15),Θ(15), c, Z, state, cohort}
at age 15 and ex-post realized shocks (m(a), ξm(a), ζn(a), ηk(a)).21 In terms of timing, we assume that the
shocks governing the evolution of personality and of types are realized first. After that, individuals observe
preference shocks and choose their preferred sector. Then, wage shocks are realized.
Let Sv(s) ⊆ S denote the set of visited states and Sf (s) ⊆ S as the set of feasible states that can reached
from s. Given the earlier time-line assumptions, we define ι(s) as the information set of the agent in state s
by specifying all components known in the state, where
ι(s) =

m(a); ζn(a); ξm(a); ηk(a) : for all s(a) ∈ Sv(s)
m(a+ 1) : for s′(a+ 1) ∈ Sf (s)
k(15),Θ(15), c, Z, state, cohort; Ω : and for all s
An individual in state s knows all state variable laws of motion, Pr(s(a+ 1)|s(a), dm(a)). He uses the distri-
20Each of the five traits can take values 1 through 7. The structure we assume avoids the need to include a five-dimensional
personality trait vector in the time-varying state space. Only the initial personality traits are included in the state space. The
traits evolve with age and with attendance at school according to equation 2 and are assumed to be measured with error.
21Three state variables are constant for every individual at age 15. g(15) = 0, x1(15) = 0, x2(15) = 0.
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bution of wage shocks Fm(ξ(s)), idiosyncratic preference shocks Fm((s)), traits transition shocks Fn(ζ(s))
and type transition shocks Fk(η(s)) to form an expectation over future states. For computational simplicity,
ξm(a) and ζn(a) are assumed to be uncorrelated and normally distributed, whereas m(a) and ηk(a) are
assumed to be type I extreme value distributed. Conditional on the unobserved types, the other shocks are
assumed to be iid over time.
5 Identification
The general procedure for incorporating multinomial types into longitudinal models dates back to Heckman
(1981), Heckman and Singer (1984). The method was first used in the context of discrete choice dynamic
programming (DCDP) models with fixed types in Keane and Wolpin (1997). Identification of a discrete
choice model with serially correlated, unobserved types is discussed in Hu et al. (2015). They discuss two
key assumptions required for identification: (1) the choice at age a dm(a) is independent of variables from
last period a− 1 after conditioning on the state variables at age a: Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a−
1), dm(a − 1)) = Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a)), where s−k(a) represents the set of state variables excluding type
k(a), and (2) the type k(a) is independent of last period choices dm(a−1) conditional on other current period
and last period state variables: Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a − 1), k(a − 1), dm(a − 1)) = Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a −
1), k(a− 1)). Following Hu et al. (2015), the conditional probability of observing a given choice, state space
and type can be factored into three terms:
Pr(dm(a), s−k(a), k(a)|dm(a− 1), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1))
= Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCP
Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Law of motion for type k
Pr(s−k(a)|dm(a− 1), sk(a− 1), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Law of motion for s−k
Hu et al. (2015) show that the right three terms can be identified with observations from at least three time
periods {dm(a), s−k(a), dm(a − 1), s−k(a − 1), dm(a − 2)}. Appendix discusses how to apply their result in
our context.22
The utility values associated with the schooling choice and with the home choice as well as the nonpe-
cuniary values of choosing a white or blue collar job are not directly observed. In the last time period, the
set-up of the choice problem is analogous that of a multinomial logit model given the types. The choices
we observe allow us to infer relative but not absolute utilities, so identification requires normalizing one of
the utility values. We normalize the nonpecuniary value of the white collar sector choice to be zero, so that
utility in that sector corresponds to the wage. Lastly, the difference in conditional choice probabilities by
22Hu et al. (2015) also make a stationary assumption on the conditional probability, but their results can be generalized to
our case where it is is age-dependent.
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type identifies the type-specific components ekm of the flow utility functions.23 Wages are directly observed,
but for selected subgroups that choose each sector. Using the one period of data (e.g. the last period), a
control function method (e.g. Heckman and Honore (1990)) could be used to identify the parameters of the
wage equations.
Personality traits are observed in multiple time periods, so it is possible to directly identify from the
data the transition process (equation 2). The final parameter that we need to identify is the discount rate,
which is identified through functional form assumptions that allow separation of the current period utility
from future expected utility.
It would, in principal, be possible to construct a maximum likelihood estimator from the estimated
conditional choice probabilities for each household. Model parameters are then identified if the first order
conditions are linearly independent. As previously described, we instead use a moment-based estimator,
because of the problem of having some missing state variables. When using moment-based estimators,
typically it is not possible to explicitly demonstrate the identification of all of the model parameters. The
hope is that by including enough sample statistics the model parameters will be identified and precisely
estimated. As described below, we choose moments that capture data variation similar to that captured
by the MLE first-order conditions. For example, the moments include (i) the proportions choosing different
sectors by age, (iii) average wages by age, (ii) average personality traits by education, age, and occupation,
and (iii) sector transition rates. The moments that we use are described in detail below.
Whether or not the model is “well-identified” using a particular vector of sample moments is often
determined after estimation has been attempted. Different sets of moments can yield different point estimates
and associated standard errors in small samples, but it is seldom possible to determine an “optimal” vector of
moments in a reasonably complex estimation problem. A specific parameter is said to be precisely estimated
if the ratio of its point estimate to its estimated standard error is large in absolute value. In our case, it is
almost never the case that this ratio of the parameter to its standard error is close to zero.
6 Estimation Strategy
6.1 Solving the dynamic programming problem
At the beginning of age a, an individual has the state vector s(a), determined by his choices up to age
a. As previously described, the evolving state variables include the accumulated sector-specific experience
xi(a), i = 1, 2, the completed schooling g(a), personality traits Θ(a) and the unobserved type k(a).24 Let
dm(t) = 1 denote that alternative m is chosen at age t. The value function at age a is the maximum over all
23Identification of these kinds of models is discussed in Horowitz (1981).
24The personality traits at the initial age may not directly be observable, so in some cases we infer them using the approach
described in Appendix B.
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possible sequences of future choices given the current state space:
V (s(a), a,Ω) = max
{dm(t)}
E
[
A∑
t=a
δτ−a
4∑
m=1
um(t)dm(t)|s(a),
]
where Ω denotes a set of parameter values. The summation over t denotes the ages and the summation over
m denotes the different sector choices. The problem can be written in Bellman equation form.
The alternative specific value function is
Vm(s(a), a,Ω) = u˜m(s(a), a) + δE [V (s(a+ 1), a+ 1,Ω)|s(a), dm(a)]
for a < A, and
Vm(s(A), A,Ω) = u˜m(S(A), A)
in the last time period. As previously noted, to facilitate computation, we impose an assumption on the
model that the sector is chosen after preference shocks are realized but before the wage shock is realized.
We denote u˜m(s(a), a) as um(s(a), a) after integrating over the wage shock distribution (i.e. u˜m(s(a), a) =∫
ξm(a) um(s(a), a)f(w(ξm(a)))dξm(a)). Wages in the white and blue collar sectors are assumed to be normally
distributed and uncorrelated (conditional on type). The expectation in the Bellman equation is taken over
future wage and preference shocks and over the unobserved type transition process. 25 The value function
is the max over the alternative specific value functions:
V (s(a), a,Ω) = max
m∈M
Vm(s(a), a,Ω)
Recall that the preference shocks enter additively into um(s(a), a) and, for computational simplicity, are
assumed to follow an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution with a location parameter 0 and a common
scale σc.
Let V˜m(s(a), a,Ω) denote the choice-specific value function excluding the contemporaneous sector-specific
preference shock m(a),.
Vm(s(a), a,Ω) = V˜m(s(a), a,Ω) + m(a).
Because of the preference shock distributional assumptions, we have
Pr(dm(a) = 1|s(a),Ω) = exp(V˜m(s(a), a,Ω)/σc)∑4
j=1 exp(V˜j(s(a), a)/σc)
25Even though the realized wage shocks do not affect the contemporaneous utility associated with different sectors, the
expected value functions will depend on the variance of the wage shocks.
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As shown by Rust (1987), the expected value function can be written as
E [V (s(a+ 1), a+ 1,Ω)|s(a), dm(a)] = Em(a) maxdm(a)
∑4
m=1 dm(a){V˜m(s(a), a,Ω) + m(a)}
= σc log
(∑4
m=1 exp(V˜m(s(a), a,Ω)/σc)
)
+ σcγ
where γ is the Euler’s constant and σc is the scale parameter of the preference shock.26
The dynamic programming problem uses backward recursion for each set of parameter values under
consideration. That is, in the last period A, when there is no future expected value function and using
the previous equation, one obtains E [V (s(A), A)|s(A− 1), dm(A− 1), A− 1] for each possible point in the
state space. Plugging in E [V (s(A), A)|s(A− 1), dm(A− 1), A− 1] into V˜j(s(A − 1), A − 1), one can then
use the same expression to obtain E [V (s(A− 1), A− 1)|s(A− 2), dm(A− 2), (A− 2)] and so on, back until
the first time period. After solving the dynamic programming problem, one obtains the expected future
value functions for all possible state points. It is then possible to use the model to simulate choices and to
implement a simulated method of moments optimization algorithm to estimate the parameters.
6.2 Simulated Method of Moments estimation
Our model parameters are estimated by simulated method of moments. We use an unconditional simulation
approach starting from age 15, because occupation-specific experience stocks, which are part of the model’s
state space, are not directly observed and therefore need to be simulated from initial conditions.
The simulation process is as follows: For each individual i, given a set of parameters Ω:
1. Solve backward for choice-specific value function Vm(s(a),Ω) and choice probability Pr(dm(a)|s(a),Ω)
following the procedure described previously.
2. Impute initial personality traits θn(15) from the observed personality traits (at up to three ages)
following the procedure described Appendix B. Initial unobserved types k(15) are drawn from equation
5.
3. Starting from s(15) = g(15) = 0, xi(15) = 0, k(15), θn(15), simulate sequential shocks {m(a), ζn(a), ξm(a), ηk(a)}
and compute the following outcomes: (1) agents’ lifetime choices dm(a); (2) wage realizations wm(a)
when m = {1, 2}, a = {18, ..., 58}; and (3) personality traits θn(a), n = {1, 2, ..., 5}.
The simulation process is repeated for all i=1,2,...,N individuals, given their initial state variables.
26This closed form representation of the value function is a big advantage in estimation because, without it, numerical
integration over the structural errors is required to get the expected value function. It also generates an analytic one-to-one
mapping between the choice probability and utility level of each choice. This tractable i.i.d. generalized extreme value (GEV)
distributions assumption is also adopted in other recent DCDP papers such as Chan (2013) and Kennan and Walker (2011).
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We then compute R moments using both the N simulated samples and the observed data, and then
calculate the weighted difference between those R simulated moments M˜N,R(Ω) and the data moments MR,
using the following objective criterion:
ΩˆN,R,W = arg min
Ω
(
(MR − M˜N,R(Ω))′WR(MR − M˜N,R(Ω))
)
(13)
where MR denotes the data moments, and M˜N,R(Ω) represents the simulated moment evaluated at the
parameter set Ω based on N repeated simulations.27
We use the variance information of each data moment to form the weighting matrix, WR. Del Boca
et al. (2014) show the consistency for this type of estimator for large sample sizes, plimN→∞M˜N,R(Ω0) =
MR(Ω0).28 In total, we match 314 moments to estimate 118 parameters. The following moments are used
in estimation:
1. Sequential life-time choices (120 moments)
• The fraction of individuals in the blue-collar occupation sector by age (15-44).
• The fraction of individuals in the white-collar occupation sector by age (15-44).
• The fraction of individuals in school by age (15-44).
• The fraction of individuals at home by age (15-44).
2. Earning profiles (108 moments)29
• Average log earnings of blue-collar workers by age (18-44).
• Average log earnings of white-collar workers by age (18-44).
• The standard deviation of log earnings of blue-collar jobs by age (18-44).
• The standard deviation of log earnings of white-collar jobs by age (18-44).
3. The transition matrix of the four sector choices from the current period to the next period (16 moments)
4. The mean value of personality traits by age, education level and occupation sector (50 moments)
• Mean values of “big five” (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness,
emotional stability) by five-year age groups.30
27This unconditional simulation algorithm is often used to estimate dynamic discrete choice models when some state variables
are unobserved(e.g. Keane and Wolpin (2001), Keane and Sauer (2010)). The consistency and other asymptotic properties of
this estimator based on unconditional simulation are discussed in Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), section 2.2.2.
28Compared with directly calculating the optimal weighting matrix, this method simplifies computation significantly. Altonji
and Segal (1996) discusses that gains from using an optimal weighting matrix may be limited.
29We do not attempt to fit earning between ages 15-17, because there are few observations have earning information at these
ages.
30The four-year age groups are 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44.
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• Mean values of “big five” (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness,
emotional stability) by education group (educational years ≤ 12, educational years > 12). 31
• Mean values of “big five” (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness,
emotional stability) by blue collar workers and white collar sector.
5. Moments that equate the distribution of initial personal traits for different age groups (20 moments):
• The difference (mean and std deviation) of “big five” (openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, emotional stability) between the young age group (15-24) and the
middle age groups (25-34,35-44).
As previously noted, for older cohorts we only observe personality traits at later ages and have to impute
the initial values. The last 20 moments are included in estimation, so that the imputed initial distributions
for older cohorts closely match the observed distributions for younger cohorts.32
7 Estimates
7.1 Parameter Values
Tables 8-10 show the model parameter estimates along with standard errors. Table 8 shows the parameters
corresponding to the per-period reward for each of the alternatives (white-collar job, blue-collar job, school-
ing, and home staying). An additional year of schooling increases both white-collar and blue-collar wage
offers by 4.5 percent. The reward for the first two years’ work experience (exp ≤ 2) is relatively high. One
year of white-collar experience increases white collar wage offers by 18.0 percent, and one-year of blue-collar
experience increases blue-collar wages by 28.7 percent. White-collar experience has a significant return in the
blue-collar sector and blue-collar experience is also rewarded in the white-collar sector. The non-pecuniary
terms capture the psychic difference between working in a white-collar or a blue-collar job. We normalize the
non-pecuniary utility from a white-collar job to 0. The non-pecuniary blue collar job premium is AU$32,188
for individuals who are not college graduates but only AU$3,911 (=32,188-28,277) for college graduates.
For the schooling option, we estimate a utility of AU$35,868 per year if an individual stays in school until
age 18; this relatively high utility is needed for the model to be able to capture the drop-off in schooling
after high school graduation. We find an annual cost of college education of AU$39,199 and a yearly cost
31The moments conditioning on educational are constructed based on individuals who are beyond age 30 and have for the
most part finished their education.
32This is a type of stationary assumption on the distribution of initial personality traits. Other initial conditions of older
and younger cohort may still differ, though, because of differences in family background. Thus, the type distribution will. not
necessarily be the same across age cohorts. The model also allows for cohort effects on the sector-specific rewards.
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of graduate school of AU$37,580.33 This cost would include both tuition and living expenditures as well as
potential psychic costs. Also, higher cognitive ability increases the return from school attendance. There
are significant cohort effects both on wage offers and on utility from schooling.
With regard to the home staying option, the flow utility is specified as quadratic in age and the age terms
are statistically significantly different from zero. Lastly, we estimate a discount rate parameter, β, equal to
0.896 and preference scale parameter σc equal to 0.90.
There is considerable variation in the estimated rewards across occupations for the types. For the two
working options, types I and II have comparative advantages. Type I receives the highest reward in the
white-collar occupation and type II the highest reward in the blue-collar occupation. With regard to the
schooling alternative, type I gets the highest reward from attending school, followed by types IV, II and III.
The benefit for type I (AU$78,651) is slightly higher than that of type IV (AU$70,185), but much higher
than for types II (AU$41,195) and III (AU$11,857). For the option of staying home, the rewards associated
with types I-IV are AU$44,752, AU$41,480, AU$35,069 and AU$26,618.
Table 9 shows the parameter estimates from the estimation of the initial type probability functions (which
are assumed to be multinomial logistic). The initial type probabilities depend on age 15 personality traits
as well as family background (as measured by parental education and whether the individual grew up with
both parents).
A high openness to experience score implies a high probability of being type I or IV but a low probability
of being type II or type III. A person with high conscientiousness is more likely to be type I or III and less
likely to be types II or IV. High agreeableness leads a higher likelihood of being type I. The last two rows of
table 9 show the malleability of types over time and how types become more persistent with age.
Table 10 shows the estimates of the probability that personality traits change, which is assumed to
potentially depend on education and age. One additional year of education at age 15 increases personality
trait scores. It increases the level of openness to experience by 0.08 (std. dev. units), conscientiousness by
0.03, extraversion by 0.08, agreeableness by 0.08 and emotional stability by 0.07. 34 The negative estimated
coefficient on the interaction term between education and age (γ3n) implies that the effect of education
diminishes with age. For example, the effect of education on conscientiousness is negligible by age 55. The
age effects on conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional stability are significantly larger than those on
the other two traits. Another pattern is that extraversion decreases with age.
33We compare our estimated costs with the real cost data collected in Australia. For example, a 2014 HSBS re-
port lists a per year cost for undergraduate study as AU$42,093, which includes AU$24,081 for fees and AU$18,012
for living costs. Source:http://www.about.hsbc.com.au/news-and-media/australia-the-most-expensive-country-for-education-
hsbc-report. Another official website for Australia gives annual tuition fees for Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and
Doctoral degree in the range of AU$15,000-AU$33,000, AU$20,000-AU$37,000 and AU$14,000 to AU$37,000, respectively.
Source:http://www.studyinaustralia.gov.au/global/australian-education/education-costs/education-costs-in-australia.
34By comparison, Kassenboehmer et al. (2018) find that university education increases scores on extraversion and agreeable-
ness for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Our sample includes individuals with both senior secondary and university
education, whereas their sample focuses on individuals with university education.
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Figure 4 shows the probability of changing type. It starts at around 0.75 at age 15 then diminishes to
almost 0 around age 30. In other words, our estimation results show that the types become relatively fixed
by the time an individual reaches age 30.
7.2 Model Fit
Figure 5 compares model simulations with the data. The panels of the figure show the proportion choosing
different sectors and the log wage of white-collar and blue-collar occupations at different ages. As seen in
Figure 5, the model captures salient features of data: (1) The fraction in blue-collar occupations exhibits
an upward jump at age 18 and then declines gradually. (2) The fraction in white-collar occupations choices
grows smoothly from nearly 0 at age 18, reaches its peak in the mid-30s, and then diminishes somewhat. (3)
Except for a small hump shape in the early 20s, the fraction that stays home is relatively flat with a slight
increase at older ages. (4) The fraction in school rapidly drops at age 18 and continues to fall until reaching
a stable level around age 25. (5) The concavity and the level of the earning profile are also captured in our
simulated sample, both for white-collar and blue-collar occupations. However, simulated log earnings for the
white collar sector are too high at younger ages (recall that very few people work in that sector at young
ages).
Table 11 shows mean values of personality traits by age, education and occupation categories. It compares
data means to the means based on model simulations. It shows that the model captures fairly well the age
trends and the differences by education level and occupation.
Table 12 compares the sector transition probabilities for the data and for the model simulations. Cell
(i, j) of this table (where i represents the row and j represents the column) gives the percentage of individuals
in sector i in the current period who switch to sector j in the next period. Our model replicates the larger
diagonal elements of the choice transition matrix, which indicates a substantial persistence in sectors over
time. Our simulation also replicates that employed people are fairly likely to switch jobs between white-collar
and blue-collar occupations but are not likely to switch to the schooling or home-staying sectors.
8 Model Simulation Results
We next use the estimated model to simulate individuals’ choices. First, we explore the link between
personality traits, types and choices. Second, we examine the relative importance of personality traits in
explaining ex-ante heterogeneity compared with other initial endowments. Third, we implement a test of the
hypothesis that the unobserved types are stable over time (which is commonly assumed in the literature).
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8.1 Understanding the link between personality traits, types and choices
Table 13 examines the type distributions within the different sectors. White-collar workers tend to be types
I or IV, whereas blue-collar workers tend to be types II and III. Also, individuals attending school are
more likely to be types I and IV, possibly because longer periods of schooling are usually required to be a
white-collar worker. Home-stayers are predominantly type III.
Figure 7, a radar chart, provides a graphical depiction of the average levels of personality traits and
cognition among types. Each equi-angular spokes (“radii”) represents one dimension of personality traits.
Each star-like hectagon denotes the values of the “big five” along with the cognitive score for each type. It
is clear that type I has the highest values of all five traits and also for cognition, because its hectagon totally
covers the other three types’ hectagon. It seems that high cognitive ability and high values of personality
traits tend to be clustered in type I individuals, who are also those that tend to acquire more schooling and
to work in the white collar sector.
Figure 8 shows how the type distribution changes with age. With age, the overall type II, III and
IV proportions decrease, while the type I proportion increases. The type changes are driven primarily by
increasing levels of conscientiousness, with age and with education (recall table 10).
Table 14 shows the fraction of individuals who change types between ages 15 and 44, conditional on their
initial type. As seen in the table, the percentage of individuals who do not change type is 52.1% for type
I, 38.2% for type II, 42.5% for type III, and 45.3% for type IV. With regard to type changes, it is more
common for individuals to switch from another type to being type I than vice versa. Individuals who are
type II at age 15 are the ones most likely to switch to a different type.
8.2 Understanding the effect of personality traits on education, earnings and
ex-ante life-time utility
To explore the importance of cognitive and noncognitive traits in affecting educational and labor market
outcomes, we report in Table 15 the effects of a one-unit standard deviation increase in initial personality
traits and cognitive abilities on earnings, education, occupational sector, ex-ante utility and type probabilities
(age ages 35-40). Increases in the initial level of openness to experience, conscientiousness, or agreeableness
generate the largest increases in log earnings and make it more likely that a person has a white collar
occupation. These traits also increase the sample fraction of type I’s. An increase in conscientiousness and
in agreeableness lead to higher levels of education, perhaps because these traits facilitate school success. An
increase in the cognitive score also increases earnings, but decreases both the fraction of white collar choices
and years of education. This is because the return of cognitive ability is higher in blue collar occupations
than its return in white collar occupations. Therefore, an increase in cognitive ability makes the blue collar
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options more attractive. As a result, individuals are more likely to choose blue collar options rather than
white collar option or schooling option.
We find our estimated returns of personality traits and cognitive ability are comparable to the existing
literature estimating the returns of non-cognitive skills. For example, one SD increase in cognitive ability
increase the expected value by AU$48,325 and one SD intervention in “Big-five” personality increase the
expected value by AU$74,882. As a comparison, Cunha et al. (2011) finds the economic value of one SD
increase in cognitive skills has a range between $25,000-135,000 and the economic value of one SD increase
in noncognitive skills has a range between $55,000-135,000.35
8.3 Testing the hypothesis of type stability
As previously noted, our model allows the unobserved types to change in a way that may depend on age
and on personality traits. However, the model nests a model with fixed types. In this section, we perform
two model specification tests:
1. Allow the type probabilities to depend on initial personality traits and on family background but not
to vary with age (a restriction on the Markov matrix that p(a) be diagonal with one on the diagonal
elements.)
2. Assume the types are drawn from a multinomial distribution that does not depend on regressors and
that types are fixed with age (a restriction on the initial type probability distribution function and also
on the Markov matrix).
We test these restrictions using a Wald test. As seen in Table 16, the fixed type models are rejected with
a p-value less than 0.01.
9 Two education policy experiments: compulsory senior secondary
school and a college subsidy
We next use the estimated dynamic discrete choice models, both the variable-type and the fixed-type variants,
to evaluate the effects of two education policies, a college tuition subsidy program and a compulsory schooling
policy.
35In their paper, the money values of cognitive and noncognitive skills vary with different education levels and cohort years.
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9.1 Using the model to simulate the effects of educational policies
In the late 1980s, the Australian government started providing financial assistance to students through a
program called the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and, after 2005, the Higher Education
Loan Programme (HELP). With the goal of relieving the financial burden of a university education, those
eligible for HECS-HELP can either receive no interest student loans or get a 10 % discount on the upfront
payment. Some students also receive direct financial help to cover living expenditures through a means-
tested programs (such as Austudy or Youth Allowance). Motivated by these financial aid programs, we use
our estimated model to simulate the effects of a hypothetical policy that reduces the college tuition cost by
50%. 36
Our second policy experiment is motivated by the spatial variation in compulsory schooling requirements
across different states and territories. The compulsory education policy in Australia is age-based. In 2009,
the minimum school leaving age in Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania was 17,
whereas the minimum age in other areas was between 15-16. 37 In 2010, areas with lower compulsory school
attendance ages came up with plans to increase compulsory schooling.38 As a result, students in all states
and territories are now required to stay in school until age 17. (National Report on Schooling in Australia
2011) Inspired by these policies, we consider the imposition of a perfectly enforced national compulsory
secondary school rule that mandates individuals to stay in school until at least age 17.39
We next use the model to simulate to the effects of the two education policies, both mean and distribu-
tional effects. To understand the importance of allowing for time-varying types, we compare the simulated
policy effects for 2,934 individuals obtained under the baseline model to those obtained under a restricted
“fixed type” model. Table 17 shows policy effects.40 Specifically, we examine effects on (1) the percentage
high school graduates; (2) the percentage college graduates; (3) the average years of education; (4) the
annual earnings for workers; and (5) the expected lifetime utility gain. In each of these categories, we first
present the values under baseline model in the row labeled as “benchmark”. The two rows labeled “50%
college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” show the deviations from baseline values under
36Our estimated annual cost of attending college is AU$39,199, which includes not only the tuition fee but also the living
cost as well as potential psychic cost. We set the tuition fee to be AU$24,000 based on various reports.(See footnote 30.) The
50% tuition subsidy is a conditional transfer with an annual value of AU$12,000.
37Source: National Report on Schooling in Australia 2009.
38As of 2010, New South Wales, Victoria, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory have requirements that local
students need to complete Year 10 and then participate in education, training or employment until they turn 17.
39Individuals who are younger than age 18 after the year 2009 in HILDA data should be already subject to the compulsory
education policy. However, currently, the policy is not strictly enforced. The school enrollment rates for teenagers ages 15-18 are
84.9%(175/206) in year 2010, 90.0%(226/251) in the year 2011, 89.8%(211/235) in the year 2012 and 83%(176/212) in the year
2013. These enrollment rates are stable and do not significantly differ for years prior to 2009. Our baseline model estimation
assumes no compulsory schooling law and we simulate the effects of a compulsory schooling law that is strictly enforced.
40Because the types change over time and are potentially influenced by education, we classified agents according to their
initial type at age 15.
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two separated policy experiments.
Comparing the effects of two policies, two features stand out. First, the compulsory schooling policy has
the most direct positive effect on the high school completion rate (+8.1pp), whereas the college subsidy has
the largest positive impact on the fraction of college graduates (+12.2pp). Second, these two policies affect
different types of individuals. The college subsidy increases the average years of completed education by
0.3-0.6 years, with the largest increase observed for type I. The compulsory school policy increases years of
education by 0.243 and 0.446 years for types II and III respectively but has almost no effect for types I and
IV.
We observe a similar pattern for labor market outcomes. Under the college subsidy intervention, types
I and IV experience an average increase in annual earnings of AU$2,259 and AU$ 2,445. The increases
observed for types II and III are AU$ 2,234 and AU$ 1,640. When implementing the compulsory schooling
policy, types II and III benefit the most. The annual earnings increases of those two types are AU$1,425 and
AU$ 2,197, whereas the changes for other two types are only AU$ 58 and AU$ 134. High school completion
is already so prevalent among types I and IV, so few individuals of those types are affected by the compulsory
schooling policy. These individuals are more likely to face the trade-off between finishing college or not and
are most strongly influenced by the college subsidy policy. In terms of utility, types I and IV benefit the
most from the college subsidy policy, although type II also benefits. All types have a negative utility change
from the compulsory schooling requirement, as it represents a constraint on their choices at early ages.41
Table 18 reports the effects of two policies on personality traits at age 30 (when most have completed
their education). The “benchmark” row shows the average trait score of each type. The rows “50% college
subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” report the additional change under these two policies.
In general, the effects of both policies on traits are positive. Of the two policies, the college tuition subsidy
has the greatest effect, increasing openness to experience, conscientiousness and emotional stability. The
effects of the compulsory schooling requirement are focussed on individuals of type II and III, particularly
in the areas of openness to experience, conscientiousness, and emotional stability.
Table 19 simulates the per capita cost and benefits of the two policies and explores how these policies
affect earnings inequality and government tax revenues. The tuition subsidy leads to a decrease in inequality
as measured by the 50th/10th quantile earnings ratio and the 90th/10th quantile ratios. In the model, the
estimated utility is measured in Australian dollars, so we can compare the average utility gain (loss) under
these two policies. The college subsidy policy increases the expected utility by AU$8,400. The compulsory
secondary school policy decreases the expected utility by AU$6,000, because it distorts the optimal choices.
41We used the estimated wage equation to determine what fraction of the earnings increase is attributable to policy effects on
years of schooling verses effects coming through changes in personality traits. For the college tuition subsidy policy, 20.7% comes
from personality trait changes. For the compulsory schooling policy, 11.5% comes from personality trait changes. Decomposition
results are available upon request.
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From the government’s perspective, a policy that increases education will also increase tax revenue. We
obtain a rough estimate of the additional tax revenue using the Australian income tax scheme for the year
2005-2006.42 The row in the table labeled “tax revenue” reports the present value of average tax revenue at
age 15 that government could collect from each individual over the lifetime. 43 The additional tax revenue is
AU$7,600 for the college tuition subsidy intervention and AU$6,400 for compulsory schooling intervention.
The presented value of tuition subsidy policy is AU$15,100 per person on average (reported in the row
“government expenditure”).
9.2 Exploring the importance of personality traits in explaining ex-ante lifetime
utility heterogeneity
We next explore which personality traits are the most important determinants of the variation in ex-ante
lifetime utility at age 15. First, we simulate lifetime ex-ante utility var(V (s(15))) for each individual given
their age 15 initial conditions s(15). Then, we redo the calculation where we eliminate the variation in all
except for one of the personality traits/cognitive ability (setting the values for other components at the mean
sample values). Let var(V (s¯(15)) represent the variance when the heterogeneity is restricted in this fashion.
In Table 20 , the importance of each personality trait is represented by the fraction of variance accounted
for when incorporating the variance only of that trait θ:
R2θ =
var(V (s¯−θ(15), θ(15)))− var(V (s¯(15))
var(V (s(15))) .
As seen in the table, openness to experience and agreeableness are the most important personality traits
in accounting for ex-ante lifetime utility variation. In total, initial personality trait heterogeneity explains
about 23.6% of the ex-ante life-time utility variation. Doing the same calculation for cognitive ability shows
that cognitive skill explains 22.9% of the total variation of ex-ante utility. The combination of personality
traits and cognitive ability explains 51.8% of the total variation of ex-ante utility.
9.3 Understanding the importance of time-varying types
To understand the empirical importance of allowing for time-varying types, we evaluate the same education
policies under the restricted “fixed types” model," in which the type probabilities depend only on family
background and initial personality traits and do not vary over time. The results are reported in Appendix
C. There are two main differences. First, as seen by comparing Table 17 with Table C.1, the policy impacts
42More specifically, no tax for income below $6000;15% for income between $6,000 and $25,000;30% for income between
$25,000 and $75,000;40% for income between $75,000 and $150,000;45% for income over $150,000.
43We set the real interest rate to be 3.48% per year, which is the average interest rate over 2001-2013.(Source:world bank)
we further assume each individual is capable to work until age 65 and the annual income is not changeable after age 45.
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are now more concentrated among certain types of individuals. The college subsidy policy has no effect on
the college graduation decision of type III and has a smaller effect on type II. Second, the effects on labor
market earnings are smaller. In our baseline model, the 50% college subsidy policy boosts employed workers’
average annual earnings of types II and III by AU$ 2,234 and AU$ 1,640. In contrast, the earnings increase
drops to AU$ 1,159 and AU$77 in the restricted “fixed type” model. The reason for the larger effects in the
varying type model is straightforward. When type is changeable, the education investment has both a direct
reward in terms of increasing wage offers and an indirect reward through the chance to become a different
type.
One can compare the earnings inequality reported in the first row of Table 19 with the first row in Table
Appendix C.2 to see how the policy effects on inequality differ for the two models. For the college tuition
policy, the 90/10 earnings ratio reduces from 3.77 to 3.67 in the varying-type model in comparison to 4.25 to
4.23 in the fixed type model. Thus, the policy effect is greater in the varying-type model. For the compulsory
schooling policy, the 90/10 earnings ratio reduces from 3.77 to 3.66 in the varying-type model in comparison
to 4.25 to 4.13 in the fixed type model, a change of similar magnitude.
9.4 Heterogeneous policy effects by family background social-economic status
(SES)
Lundberg (2013) emphasizes the importance of family background in understanding the correlation between
personality traits and college graduation. We next examine how individuals from different socio-economic
status (SES) backgrounds respond to the policy interventions. SES is defined in terms of parents’ educational
attainment. In group I, both parents have education equal to high school or less. In group II, one parent has
some college, and in group III, both parents have some college.44 We find the personality patterns between
individuals from different backgrounds are similar to those reported in Lundberg (2013). Individuals from
more advantaged family backgrounds tend to have higher scores for conscientiousness, openness to experience
as well as emotional stability.
Table 21 examines whether type stability differs across SES groups. It shows that individuals from lower
SES backgrounds are more likely to experience type changes as they age. They are also more likely to have
their type affected by the educational policy interventions. In contrast, individuals from higher SES groups
are more likely to begin life as type I (the type that tends to pursue schooling and to obtain a white collar
job) and to not change their type.
Tables 22 and 23 summarize the effects of both the college subsidy policy and the compulsory senior
secondary school policy. The policy effect of the college tuition subsidy is substantial across all SES groups
44We did not consider the family intactness as an additional dimension, because the majority of the sample (82.89%) grew
up with both biological parents.
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in terms of increasing education and earnings. We also observe an increase in the percentage of white collar
workers and a decrease in the percentage blue collar for all SES groups. As seen in Table 23, effects on
personality traits also occur across all SES groups. The compulsory schooling policy similarly affects all SES
groups in terms of education, earnings and personality traits, although the effects are smaller in magnitude
than for the tuition subsidy.
10 Conclusions
This paper develops a dynamic model of schooling and occupational choices that incorporates personality
traits. As is common in the discrete choice literature, we introduce unobservable types’ to capture agents’
heterogeneous comparative advantages in schooling and particular occupational sectors. In line with some
recent papers in the literature (Hu et al. (2015)and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011)), we adopt a specification
with time-varying types, where the probability of changing type can depend on age and on personality traits.
We perform a test of the assumption that types are fixed, which is rejected in our data. The estimates indicate
that types are malleable when agents are young but become stable by age 30. Another finding is that high
levels of cognitive skills and high personality trait scores, in all five dimensions, tend to be clustered in a
certain type of individual, type I in our analysis. This type also acquires more schooling and tends to work
in the white collar sector.
Much of the prior economics literature emphasizes the role of cognitive skills in determining lifetime
outcomes. Our analysis shows that cognitive skills are important determinants of wage offers but also that
having high cognitive skills, on average, goes hand-in-hand with having high non-cognitive skills.45 We find
that initial personality trait heterogeneity at age 15 explains roughly the same percentage of ex ante lifetime
utility variation (24%) as does cognitive ability (23%). Because cognitive and noncognitive attributes tend
to be positively correlated, studies that only focus on cognitive traits likely overstate their importance as a
determinant of labor market success.
Using the estimated dynamic discrete choice model, we evaluate two education policies: compulsory
senior secondary school and a 50% college tuition subsidy. Both policies increase educational attainment,
but their distributional effects are very different. The compulsory school policy is effective for individuals at
risk for not finishing high school, represented by types II and III in the model. The college tuition subsidy
policy effects are more evenly distributed, affecting all types. When the data are divided by SES family
background, we see that both educational policies benefit individuals from all SES backgrounds.
We show that a fixed type model ignores the potential effect of education on improving a person’s type.
This channel is empirically important to consider when evaluating the distributional effects of education
45See, for example, Neal and Johnson (1996).
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policies. The simulated policy responses are greater and the effects evenly distributed in the sample in
a varying-type model than in a fixed-type model. Moreover, we find that individuals from lower SES
backgrounds are the ones most likely to change their types.
In summary, our results indicate that one of the benefits of attending school is that it changes some
personality attributes, which, along with increased schooling, enhances earnings. A caveat to our findings
is that personality traits in our data are measured as of age 15, and they likely reflect parental investment
and life experience from conception to age 15. As emphasized in Cunha et al. (2010), the most cost effective
policies for fostering the accumulation of desirable personality traits may be policies that are targeted during
early childhood years rather than high school or post-secondary schooling interventions. Nonetheless, we find
that policies that encourage secondary school and college attendance can be effective in enhancing lifetime
earnings and ameliorating inequality.
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Appendices
A Identification of the transition matrix
We provide a sketch of how the Markov law of motion Pr(dm(a), s−k(a), k(a)|dm(a−1), s−k(a−1), k(a−1))
can be identified based on observations from at least three consecutive time periods {dm(a), s−k(a), dm(a−
1), s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2)}. The proof follows Hu et al. (2015). The main difference is that Hu et al. (2015)
make a stationary assumption, whereas our assumptions are conditional on age. The proof shows that the
law of motion can be uniquely decomposed into the following three components. Put it in a different way,
the proof shows that the following three components are identified separately.
Pr(dm(a), s−k(a), k(a)|dm(a− 1), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1))
= Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCP
Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Law of motion for type k
Pr(s−k(a)|dm(a− 1), sk(a− 1), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Law of motion for s−k
First, we make the following assumption, which is satisfied under our model specification:
Assumption 1. Limited feedback: (1)Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a), s−k(a−1), k(a−1), dm(a−1)) = Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a)).
(2) Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1), dm(a− 1)) = Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1)).
In addition, we assume
Assumption 2. Full rank: for any{s−k(a), dm(a− 1), sk(a− 1)},
[Pr(dm(a) = i, s−k(a), dm(a− 1)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2) = j)]i,j
is invertible.
Lastly, we require assumptions that given the same state space, different types have different choice proba-
bilities:
Assumption 3. Distinctive types: For any two different types k1 and k2 at age a-1, ∀k1, k2 ∈ k(a− 1)
Pr(dm(a− 1)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k1(a− 1)) 6= Pr(dm(a− 1)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k2(a− 1))
Assumption 4. First order stochastic dominance: Pr(dm(a−1)|s−k(a), s−k(a−1), k(a−1)) is stochas-
tically increasing in the sense of first-order stochastic increasing in k(a− 1) for fixed (s−k(a), sk(a− 1)).
Theorem 5. Under assumptions 1,2,3,4, the density function Pr(dm(a), s−k(a), dm(a−1), s−k(a−1), dm(a−
2)) uniquely determines the conditional probability function Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a)), the law of motion for k
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Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a−1), k(a−1)) and the law of motion for the rest state variables Pr(s−k(a)|dm(a), s−k(a−
1), k(a− 1)).
Proof. Our proof of theorem 5 follows Hu et al. (2015). Their proof is for the stationary Markov case, but
we find the theorem still holds when the conditional choice probability is age-dependent. We assume that
the discrete values {dm(a − 2), dm(a − 1), dm(a), so(a), so(a − 1)} share the common support {1, 2, ..., J},
then introduce the following notations of J-dimensional square matrices.
A = [Pr(dm(a) = i, s−k(a), dm(a− 1)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2) = j)]i,j ;
B = [Pr(dm(a) = i|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1) = k)]i,k ;
C = [Pr(k(a− 1) = k|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2) = j)]k,j ;
D1 = diag{[Pr(dm(a− 1))|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1) = k]k};
D2 = diag{[Pr(s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1) = k)]k};
E = [Pr(dm(a) = i, s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2) = j)]i,j ;
F = [Pr(k(a) = l|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1) = k)]l,k;
G = [Pr(dm(a) = i|s−k(a), k(a) = l)]i,l
H = [Pr(s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1) = k) · Pr(k(a− 1) = k|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2))]k,j
From the above matrices, only matrices A and E are observed. Given the matrix definitions, the following
equation
Pr(dm(a), s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 1)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2)) =∑
k(a−1)
Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1)) Pr(dm(a− 1), s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1)) Pr(k(a− 1)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2))
(14)
can be written as
A = B ·D1 ·D2 · C
Integrating over dm(a− 1) in equation 14 yields
Pr(dm(a), s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2)) =∑
k(a−1)
Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1)) Pr(s−k(a)|s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1)) Pr(k(a− 1)|s−k(a− 1), dm(a− 2))
(15)
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which is equivalent to the following matrix notation equation
E = B ·D2 · C
Given the assumption that E is invertible (Assumption 2), we can get
A · E−1 = B ·D1 ·B−1
Using assumption 3, the eigenvalue-eigenvector of A · E−1 should be unique46, thus B is identified as the
eigenvector andD1 is identified as eigenvalues. The assumption 3 also infer that B andD1 are both invertible,
thus we have the identification of H:
H ≡ D2 · C = D−11 ·B−1 ·A
Therefore, D2 and C are identified separately under Assumption 4.
Corollary 6. The age-dependent conditional choice probability Pr(dm(a)|s−k(a), k(a)) and law of motion
for s−k(a) are identified non-parametrically.
Given the identification of D1 and D2, we can identify
Pr(s−k(a), dm(a−1)|s−k(a), k(a−1)) = Pr(dm(a−1)|s−k(a), s−k(a−1), k(a−1)) Pr(s−k(a)|s−k(a−1), k(a−1))
Them the age-dependent conditional choice probability and law of motion for s−k(a) are two marginal
distributions of Pr(s−k(a), dm(a− 1)|s−k(a), k(a− 1)):
Pr(s−k(a), dm(a−1)|s−k(a), k(a−1)) = Pr(dm(a− 1)|s−k(a), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCP
Pr(s−k(a)|dm(a− 1), s−k(a− 1), k(a− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
law of motion for s−k
Corollary 7. The law of motion for types Pr(k(a)|s−k(a), s−k(a − 1), k(a − 1)) is also identified non-
parametrically.
F is the law of motion for k, and G is the conditional choice probability we just identified. Given
B = G ·F , F can be recovered by the equation F = G−1 ·B. The conclusions from corollary 6 and corollary
7 complete the proof.
46The summation of each column of B should be equal to one. Thus the decomposition is unique up to this normalization
constraint
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B Method used to impute initial age 15 personality traits
In many cases, sampled individuals are older than age 15, so we do not directly observe initial personality
traits. The data contain up to three measures of personality traits, each measured at a time four years apart.
We next describe the method that we use to impute the initial personality traits θn(15) based on these three
measures, θM1n (a1), θM2n (a2), θM3n (a3), observed at ages a1, a2, a3 and using the structure of our model. Given
the current trial parameter values Ω, personality trait n at age 15 (θn(15)) is obtained as follows:
1. From equation 2 in subsection 4.1, we solve the projection of initial personality θn(15) based on the
measures on age a1θn(a1):
θn(15) = θn(a1)− (γ0n + γ1ng(a1) + γ2n(a− 15)g(a) + γ3n(a− 15) + γ4n(a− 15)2)
where a1 is the age when individual’s personality trait θn is surveyed and g(a) is the accumulative
education years at age a1.
2. Substituting θn(a1) = θM1n (a1)− ζn(a1), where ζn(a1) is the unobserved measurement error at age a1
with mean 0. Then
θn(15) = θM1n (a1)− (γ0n + γ1ng(a1) + γ2n(a− 15)g(a) + γ3n(a− 15) + γ4n(a− 15)2)− ζn(a1)
3. Define θM1n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a1), its value could be directly calculated by
θM1n (15) = θM1n (a1)− (γ0n + γ1ng(a1) + γ2n(a− 15)g(a) + γ3n(a− 15) + γ4n(a− 15)2)
4. For the other two personality measurements at age a2 and age a3, (θM2n (a2) and θM3n (a3)), repeat steps
(1)− (3) to get
θM2n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a2), θM3n (15) ≡ θn(15) + ζn(a3)
5. This procedure provides three different imputed values of initial personality traits, each with a mea-
surement error that is assumed to be mean 0 drawn from an i.i.d distribution. We obtain our measure
of the personality trait at age 15 θn(15) as the mean of these three values:
θn(15) =
1
3(θ
M1
n (15) + θM2n (15) + θM3n (15))
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C Additional results for the fixed type model
Appendix C.1 - The effects of educational policies under the restricted model with fixed types
Model simulation Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Percentage Finishing High school
Benchmark 100.0% 91.1% 66.5% 100.0% 87.8%
50% college subsidy 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.0% 8.9% 33.5% 0.0% 12.2%
Percentage College Graduates
Benchmark 57.5% 13.9% 0.1% 84.7% 38.3%
50% college subsidy 20.7% 9.3% 0.9% 7.0% 8.9%
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.8% 0.2%
Years of Education
Benchmark 15.639 12.671 11.565 16.770 14.100
50% college subsidy 0.597 0.357 0.038 0.490 0.350
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.001 0.129 0.554 0.035 0.208
Annual Earnings (for workers, unit: AU$ )
Benchmark 114,110 84,350 32,878 64,128 74,240
50% college subsidy 2,241.3 1,159.4 77.489 1,989.1 1,408.8
Compulsory senior secondary school 14.688 622.56 1366.3 245.53 338.89
Fraction Blue Collar (%)
Benchmark 9.9% 54.4% 59.6% 12.4% 34.2%
50% college subsidy -1.4% -0.6% -0.2% -2.8% -1.2%
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.0% -0.3% 0.5% -0.4% 0.0%
Fraction White Collar (%)
Benchmark 89.9% 44.9% 11.8% 84.4% 55.7%
50% college subsidy 1.4% 0.6% 0.1% 3.7% 1.4%
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.0% 0.4% 0.9% 0.5% 0.5%
Utility Change (Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 88.168 82.715 82.729 86.148 84.958
50% college subsidy 0.925 0.692 0.715 0.949 0.823
Compulsory senior secondary school -0.322 -0.428 -0.435 -0.306 -0.373
Note: The rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” show the deviations from
baseline values under the two separate policy experiments.
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Appendix C.2 - Cost-benefit analysis of the two educational policies under the restricted model with fixed
types
Baseline case 50% college Compulsory senior
(no policy) subsidy secondary school
Earning inequality (for workers) at age 40
50/10 earnings ratio 2.48 2.49 2.42
90/10 earnings ratio 4.25 4.23 4.13
Expected utility (Unit: AU$ 10000) 84.96 85.78 84.58
Expected utility changes (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 0.82 -0.37
Government expenditure (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 1.38 0.00
Exp. utility - gov exp. (Unit: AU$ 10000) - -0.56 -0.37
Tax revenue (Unit: AU$ 10000) 28.21 28.70 28.46
Increase in tax revenue (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 0.48 0.25
Note: Inequality is measured by the 90/10 and 50/10 percentile earnings ratios. The row “Expected utility” reports
the expected life-time utility at age 15. The extra gain (loss) under the two policies are reported in the next row
“Expected utility change”. The row “Government expenditure” reports the average subsidy the government needs
to pay for each individual. The differences between expected utility gain (loss) and government expenditure are
reported in the next row “Exp. utility - gov exp”. The row “Tax revenue” shows the expected value of average tax
revenue that government would collect from each individual over the life time (until age 65). The change under the
two policies are reported in the next row “Increase in tax revenue”.
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Tables
Table 1: Definitions and examples of the ANZSCO coding of occupations
Collars Occupations Examples
White Collar Managers Legislators, senior officials, corporate/general managers
Professionals Professionals, physicians, mathematician, engineer and life
science
Technicians and
tradespersons
Technicians and associate professionals, physical and
engineering scientists, life science and health associate
Clerical and
administrative workers
Service workers and shop workers, personal and protective
service workers, models, salespersons
Blue Collar Community and
personal service workers
Office clerks, consumer service clerks
Sales workers Sales representative, insurance brokers, checkout operator,
models and telemarketers
Machinery operators
and drivers
Industrial spray painters, sewing machinist, motion picture
projectionist, crane operator, forklift drivers and train driver
Labourers Cleaners, steel fixer, product assembler, packer, slaughter, farm
worker, kitchen hand, freight handler and handy persons
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Table 2: The survey illustration of personality questionnaire
+ +
+ 10 +LIA M 2005              
✘
B17 Does your household regularly pay someone to
do any of the housework (cleaning, washing,
ironing, cooking, etc)? (Cross        one box)  
Yes
No 
✘
B18 Does your household regularly pay someone to
do any gardening or lawn mowing?
(Cross        one box)  
Yes
No
B19 How well do the following words describe you? For each word, cross one box to indicate how well that
word describes you. There are no right or wrong answers.
(Cross         one box for each word.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
talkative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Does not describe
me at all
Describes 
me very well
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sympathetic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
orderly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
envious
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
jealous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
deep
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
intellectual
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
withdrawn
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
extroverted
cold
disorganised
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
harsh
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
temperamental
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
complex
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
shy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
systematic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
warm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
moody
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
efficient
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
philosophical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
fretfulbashful
kind imaginative
inefficient
touchy
creative
quiet
cooperative
sloppy
✘
enthusiastic
selfish
careless
calm
traditional
lively
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ELSPAYGD 
EPNJEAL
EPNINTEL
EPNEXTRO 
EPNCOLD
EPNDORG
EPNTEMP
EPNCOMPX
EPNSHY
EPNWARM
EPNEFFIC 
EPNFRET 
EPNIMAG 
EPNENTH
EPNSELF
EPNCLESS
EPNCALM
EPNTRAD
EPNLIVLY
Wave 5 Self Completion Questionnaire e120c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
1
2
ELSPAYHW
EPNTALK
EPNSYMP
EPNORDER
EPNENVY
EPNDEEP
EPNWD
EPNHARSH
EPNSYST
EPNMOODY
EPNPHIL
EPNBFUL
EPNKIND
EPNINEFF
EPNTOUCH
EPNCREAT
EPNQUIET 
EPNCOOP 
EPNSOPPY 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Table 3: Sample summary statistics
Variable Proportions(%) Variable Proportions(%)
State Background info when you were 14
New South Wales 31.02 Father Education
Victoria 25.46 College 64.52
Queensland 20.42 Not College 35.48
South Australia 8.83 Mother Education
Western Australia 8.83 College 49.05
Tasmania 2.83 Not College 50.95
Northern Territory 0.55 Father Working
Australian Capital Territory 2.08 Employed 95.81
Year (Cohort) Not Employed 4.19
1961-1969 20.01 Father Occupation
1970-1979 28.83 White Collar 72.32
1980-1989 27.13 Blue Collar 27.68
1990-1998 24.03 Mother Working
Ever had siblings Employed 63.70
Had siblings 95.71 Not Employed 36.30
No siblings 4.29 Mother Occupation
Sibling numbers Not Asked 16.43
Not Asked 4.36 White Collar 52.86
1 29.41 Blue Collar 30.71
2 32.48 Family Intactness
3 17.01 Both parents 80.3
4 8.79 Father and step 1.3
5 or more 7.95 Mother and step 5.01
Eldest Sibling Father only 3.03
Not Asked 4.29 Mother only 8.76
Oldest 34.9 Other 1.6
Not Oldest 60.8
Total Individuals 2,934
Note: This table shows summary statistics for males age 15-44. The family background information (parental
education, employment, occupations and family intactness) refer to the time when individuals were age 14. Data
source: HILDA, 2001-2013.
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Table 4: Average personality traits by education level
Education Level Open. to Exp. Conscientiousness Agreeableness Extroversion Emotional Stab.
Sec. school or lower 4.243 4.824 5.070 4.447 5.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
College dropouts 4.357 4.883 5.122 4.350 5.012
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
College graduates 4.577 5.028 5.160 4.293 5.113
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Note: This table shows the mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the “big-five” personality traits. The sample is HILDA,
waves 5, 9 and 13. Each trait has a value ranging from 1 to 7.
Table 5: Average personality traits by occupation sector
Occupation Open. to Exp. Conscientiousness Agreeableness Extroversion Emotional Stab.
White-collar 4.452 5.035 5.159 4.381 5.091
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Blue-collar 4.153 4.887 5.088 4.382 5.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Note: This table shows the mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the “big five” personality traits by occupation group
(white collar and blue collar). The sample is HILDA, waves 5, 9 and 13. The personality trait values range from 1 to 7.
Table 6: The effect of education/occupation changes on personality traits, fixed effect models
(1) Opn (2) Cos (3) Agr (4) Ext (5) Stb
Education (β1) 0.150∗ -0.0489 0.0943 -0.0553 -0.147∗
(0.0587) (0.0592) (0.0619) (0.0509) (0.0642)
Age ∗ Edu/100 (β2) -0.493∗ 0.218 -0.211 0.189 0.609∗
(0.228) (0.230) (0.241) (0.198) (0.250)
Age (β3) 0.046 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0482 0.0193 -0.00726
(0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0340) (0.0279) (0.0352)
Age2/100 (β4) -0.0694 -0.152∗∗ -0.0639 -0.0687 0.0226
(0.0566) (0.0572) (0.0598) (0.0491) (0.0619)
White Collar (β5) -0.103 0.03 -0.0897 -3.69e−4 -0.068
(0.0622) (0.0628) (0.0657) (0.0680) (0.0540)
Blue Collar (β6) -0.0267 0.00946 -0.0592 0.0122 0.0100
(0.0632) (0.0638) (0.0667) (0.0549) (0.0691)
R2 0.828 0.823 0.762 0.866 0.800
Observations 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800
Notes: The sample includes males whose personality traits are measured at least once between ages 15 and
30. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 7: How personality traits and cognitive ability relate to log wages
Log earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Education 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.133***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Potential experience 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.172***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Potential experience squared /100 -0.396*** -0.396*** -0.377***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Openness -0.054*** -0.056***
... (0.006) (0.006)
Conscientiousness 0.078*** 0.083***
... (0.006) (0.006)
Emotional stability -0.015* -0.011
... (0.006) (0.006)
Agreeableness -0.026*** -0.030***
... (0.007) (0.007)
Extraversion 0.031*** 0.028***
... (0.006) (0.006)
Cognitive 0.077*** 0.073***
... (0.009) (0.009)
Family Characteristics No No Yes
Observations 16408 16408 16408
R Square 0.303 0.318 0.351
Notes: The sample includes males whose personality traits are measured at least once between age 15 and
44. The family background variables includes family intactness, father’s occupation, parental education,
sibling numbers, birth order and cohort. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Model parameter estimates: reward functions
1.White-Collar 2.Blue-Collar 3. Schooling
Parameters S.D. Parameters S.D. Parameters S.D.
Schooling 0.0447 0.0016 0.0449 0.0026 College cost (per year) 3.9199 0.5982
White-Collar experience 0.0385 0.0015 0.0174 0.0013 Graduate cost (per year) 3.7580 1.0751
Blue-Collar experience 0.0105 0.0012 0.0347 0.0029 Additional utility before age 19 3.5868 0.1984
“Own” experience squared/100 -0.0387 0.0038 -0.0194 0.0029 Cognitive ability 0.2074 0.0471
“Own” experience×edu 0.0084 0.0029 0.0428 0.0062 Constant:
“Own” experience≤2 0.1804 0.0281 0.2870 0.0474 Type I 7.8651 0.1883
Cognitive ability 0.1028 0.0110 0.3018 0.0232 Type II 4.1195 0.2462
Standard Error 0.4808 0.0212 0.4334 0.0309 Type III 1.1857 0.3083
Constant: Type IV 7.0185 0.0842
Type I 10.3560 0.0187 9.6629 0.0260 Cohort (Omitted cat:60-69)
Type II 10.2560 0.0177 10.0050 0.0374 70-79 0.3137 0.1057
Type III 9.7467 0.0346 9.2222 0.0339 80-89 2.7839 0.1772
Type IV 9.7990 0.0264 9.0537 0.0452 90-99 3.1411 0.3954
State (Omitted cat:NSW)
VIC -0.0708 0.0091 -0.0893 0.0120 4. Home-staying
QLD -0.1353 0.0171 -1.0000 0.0773 Age 0.0228 0.0022
SA -0.2336 0.1482 0.5000 0.0827 Age squared/100 0.0300 0.0045
WA 0.0412 0.0386 0.0429 0.0182 Constant:
TAS -0.2749 0.0804 -0.0778 0.0851 Type I 4.4752 0.0949
NT -0.0453 0.0266 -0.2186 0.0983 Type II 4.1480 0.0635
ACT 0.2970 0.0959 -0.0330 2.7978 Type III 3.5069 0.0613
Cohort (Omitted cat:60-69) Type IV 2.6618 0.1903
70-79 0.1257 0.0110 0.1192 0.0294
80-89 -0.1086 0.0117 0.2936 0.0151
90-99 -0.0924 0.0172 -0.4408 0.1189
Non-pecuniary Values Other Primitive Parameters
Constant - 3.2188 0.0920 Preference Shock 0.8995 0.0322
College Premium - -2.8277 0.3796 Discount Factor 0.8960 0.0100
Note: Data source: HILDA, 2001-2013. The estimates are based on 2934 males whose personality traits are measured
at least one time between ages 15-44. The unit for the non-pecuniary, school and home-staying columns is 10,000AU$.
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Table 9: Estimated coefficients on type probabilities
Types I(baseline) II III IV
Constant term - -1.100 -0.310 -0.480
(0.097) (0.083) (0.054)
Openness to Experience - -0.800 -0.700 0.202
(0.137) (0.076) (0.112)
Conscientiousness - -0.490 -0.280 -0.527
(0.088) (0.056) (0.073)
Extraversion - 0.206 0.114 -0.470
(0.083) (0.041) (0.058)
Agreeableness - -0.490 -0.500 -0.480
(0.095) (0.071) (0.056)
Emotional Stability - -0.014 -0.100 -0.019
(0.001) (0.021) (0.114)
Parental Education (Omitted cat: no college)
One college -0.500 0.030 -0.086 0.017
(0.180) (0.216) (6.847) (0.161)
Two colleges 0.138 0.169 -0.115 0.005
(0.072) (0.126) (0.193) (0.259)
Family Intactness Dummy (Omitted cat: intact family)
Living with at most 0.085 0.065 0.140 -0.035
one parent at age 14 (0.260) (0.508) (0.363) (0.364)
Type Persistence Time shift term Age− 15 (Age−15)2100
Values 0.320 0.230 1.191
(0.025) (0.012) (0.110)
Note: The estimates are based on 2934 males whose personality traits are measured at least one time between 15-44
over the years 2001-2013. The standard deviations of the estimates are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Estimated model coefficients for personality trait transitions
Traits Edu Edu ∗ (Age− 15)/100 Age− 15 (Age− 15)2/100
Openness to Experience 0.0796 -0.4025 0.0108 0.0034
(0.0201) (0.0691) (0.0044) (0.0500)
Conscientiousness 0.0616 -0.2980 0.0486 -0.0736
(0.0215) (0.0801) (0.0089) (0.0217)
Extraversion 0.0348 -0.1342 -0.0176 0.0115
(0.0159) (0.1308) (0.0041) (0.0699)
Agreeableness 0.0785 -0.6331 0.0333 -0.0263
(0.0195) (0.1067) (0.0090) (0.0530)
Emotional Stability 0.0716 -0.1544 -0.0247 0.0793
(0.0353) (0.2438) (0.0332) (0.0741)
Note: The estimates are based on 2934 males whose personality traits are measured at least one time between
15-44. The standard deviations of the estimates are in parenthesis.
Table 11: The comparison of mean data and model simulation values (conditional on age groups, education
groups and occupation sectors)
Open to Exp Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional Stab.
Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim
Age groups
15-19 4.308 4.274 4.532 4.535 4.613 4.616 4.994 4.988 5.083 5.097
20-24 4.377 4.443 4.736 4.787 4.569 4.585 5.085 5.099 5.012 5.070
25-29 4.416 4.417 4.957 4.932 4.411 4.393 5.119 5.114 5.048 5.034
30-34 4.376 4.393 4.956 4.969 4.348 4.360 5.147 5.201 5.039 5.027
35-39 4.328 4.332 5.028 5.039 4.304 4.310 5.149 5.183 5.087 5.066
40-44 4.323 4.321 5.044 5.032 4.204 4.205 5.101 5.122 5.033 5.014
Education
year ≤ 12 4.170 4.131 4.992 4.981 4.302 4.310 5.092 5.119 5.024 5.017
year > 12 4.552 4.560 5.040 5.055 4.229 4.242 5.176 5.206 5.088 5.047
Occupation
Blue Collar 4.154 4.170 4.887 4.863 4.382 4.387 5.089 5.060 5.014 5.032
White Collar 4.452 4.528 5.035 5.022 4.381 4.339 5.159 5.209 5.090 5.062
Note: Data source: HILDA 2005, 2009 and 2013. Males whose personality traits are measured at least one time
between 15-44.
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Table 12: The comparison of the data and model simulation transition probabilities
Schooling Blue-collar White-collar Home staying
Schooling Data 0.488 0.206 0.215 0.090
Sim 0.472 0.167 0.273 0.088
Blue-collar Data 0.020 0.781 0.153 0.047
Sim 0.040 0.781 0.108 0.071
White-collar Data 0.021 0.104 0.846 0.029
Sim 0.042 0.082 0.844 0.032
Home staying Data 0.016 0.285 0.223 0.476
Sim 0.087 0.362 0.218 0.334
Note: Current choices are shown in the left column and next period’s choice in the top row.
Table 13: Simulated type percentages for different sector choices
Occupation Type I Type II Type III Type IV
White-collar 44.08% 14.46% 11.80% 29.67%
Blue-collar 10.66% 28.45% 47.37% 13.53%
Schooling 36.30% 12.70% 13.63% 37.37%
Home staying 2.37% 4.37% 82.55% 10.71%
Total 28.67% 17.63% 29.35% 24.35%
Table 14: The transition probabilities of types between age 15 and age 44
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Type I 0.521 0.106 0.184 0.190
Type II 0.190 0.382 0.230 0.197
Type III 0.243 0.166 0.425 0.166
Type IV 0.244 0.112 0.191 0.453
Note: This table displays the transition probabilities of types from the initial types at age 15 in the left column to
the ultimate types at age 44 in the top row.
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Table 15: Simulated effects of one-unit standard deviation increase in personality traits and cognitive abilities
(Log) annual White collar Blue collar Education Ex-ante Initial types at age 15
earning occupation occupation years utility I II III IV
Baseline 11.133 0.594 0.306 5.328 855,560 0.252 0.179 0.317 0.252
Opn (+1 SD) 0.039 0.096 -0.076 0.716 25,031 0.046 -0.061 -0.109 0.124
Cos (+1 SD) 0.037 0.017 -0.014 0.033 12,869 0.062 -0.024 0.009 -0.046
Ext (+1 SD) 0.004 -0.036 0.034 -0.327 -1,190 0.004 0.045 0.029 -0.078
Agr (+1 SD) 0.053 0.039 -0.028 0.177 21,901 0.063 -0.009 -0.028 -0.026
Stb (+1 SD) 0.011 0.012 -0.007 0.050 5,512 0.006 0.012 -0.021 0.004
All (+1 SD) 0.170 0.124 -0.094 0.576 74,882 0.242 -0.061 -0.109 -0.072
Cog (+1 SD) 0.060 -0.052 0.088 -0.435 48,325 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The expected ex-ante utility is an Australian dollar equivalent measure at age 15. The first row shows the
simulated levels under baseline model. Rows (2)-(8) display the deviation from baseline levels from a one standard
deviation unit increase in each and all personality traits and in cognitive ability.
Table 16: Model specification Wald tests
Types are fixed and determined Types are fixed and do not depend
by initial personality traits on personality traits
Null Hypothesis H0: 1γ7 = 0 H0 :
1
γ7
= 0, γ4kn = 0
Wald test 157.54 1310.1
The number of restrictions 1 16
χ2(0.01) criteria 6.64 32.00
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Table 17: The effect of educational policies on schooling and labor market outcomes, by type
Model Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Percentage Finishing High school (%)
Benchmark 99.1% 91.1% 80.8% 99.5% 91.9%
50% college subsidy 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
Compulsory schooling 0.9% 8.9% 19.2% 0.5% 8.1%
Percentage College Graduates
Benchmark 49.9% 32.1% 26.2% 54.8% 40.5%
50% college subsidy 14.3% 13.5% 9.1% 12.9% 12.2%
Compulsory schooling 0.0% 2.3% 2.4% 0.3% 1.2%
Years of Education
Benchmark 15.035 13.812 13.343 15.226 14.328
50% college subsidy 0.530 0.549 0.363 0.543 0.484
Compulsory schooling 0.012 0.243 0.446 0.018 0.193
Annual Earnings (for workers, unit: AU$)
Benchmark 91,026 75,998 65,409 78,804 77,487
50% college subsidy 2,259 2,234 1,640 2,445 2,142
Compulsory schooling 58 1,425 2,187 134 909
Fraction Blue Collar (%)
Benchmark 21.5% 36.3% 39.1% 22.7% 30.0%
50% college subsidy -2.9% -2.9% -2.0% -3.1% -2.7%
Compulsory schooling 0.0% -1.4% -1.3% -0.1% -0.7%
Fraction White Collar (%)
Benchmark 72.8% 56.2% 46.5% 70.2% 60.8%
50% college subsidy 3.4% 3.3% 1.9% 3.7% 3.0%
Compulsory schooling 0.0% 2.0% 2.7% 0.2% 1.3%
Utility Change(Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 88.932 83.129 83.24 86.822 85.556
50% college subsidy 0.950 0.696 0.723 0.965 0.836
Compulsory schooling -0.525 -0.644 -0.662 -0.548 -0.596
Note: The rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” show deviations from
benchmark values under two separate policy experiments. The annual earnings, the fraction blue collar and the
fraction white collar are for workers age 35 to 40.
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Table 18: The effect of educational policies on personality traits, by type
Model Type I Type II Type III Type IV Total
Openness to Experience (at age 30)
Benchmark 4.779 3.998 4.085 4.747 4.411
50% college subsidy 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.011
Compulsory schooling 0.000 0.008 0.013 0.001 0.006
Conscientiousness (at age 30)
Benchmark 5.293 4.808 4.894 4.804 4.956
50% college subsidy 0.011 0.01 0.006 0.011 0.009
Compulsory schooling 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.001 0.005
Extraversion (at age 30)
Benchmark 4.635 4.609 4.475 4.090 4.442
50% college subsidy 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.007
Compulsory schooling 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.004
Agreeableness (at age 30)
Benchmark 5.483 4.966 4.996 5.142 5.150
50% college subsidy -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
Compulsory schooling 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 -0.003
Emotional Stability (at age 30)
Benchmark 5.106 5.153 5.029 4.942 5.049
50% college subsidy 0.027 0.025 0.015 0.027 0.023
Compulsory schooling 0.001 0.017 0.028 0.001 0.012
Note: The rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory schooling” show the deviations from benchmark
values under two separate policy experiments. The calculation simulates personality traits at age 30.
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Table 19: Cost-benefit analysis of the two educational policies
Benchmark case 50% college Compulsory senior
(no policy) subsidy secondary school
Earning inequality (for workers) at age 40
50/10 earnings ratio 2.31 2.28 2.25
90/10 earnings ratio 3.77 3.67 3.66
Expected utility (Unit: AU$ 10000) 85.56 86.39 84.96
Expected utility change (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 0.84 -0.60
Government expenditure (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 1.51 0.00
Exp. utility - gov exp. (Unit: AU$ 10000) - -0.67 -0.60
Tax revenue (Unit: AU$ 10000) 29.78 30.54 30.41
Increase in tax revenue (Unit: AU$ 10000) - 0.76 0.64
Note: Inequality is measured by the 90/10 and 50/10 percentile earnings ratios. The row “Expected utility” reports
the expected life-time utility at age 15. The extra gain (loss) under the two policies are reported in the next row
“Expected utility change”. The row “Government expenditure” reports the average subsidy the government needs to
pay for each individual. The differences between expected utility gain (loss) and government expenditure are reported
in the next row “Exp. utility - gov exp”. The row “Tax revenue” shows the expected value of average tax revenue
that government would collect from each individual over the life time (until age 65). The changes under the two
policies are reported in the next row “Increase in tax revenue”.
Table 20: Percent variation in ex-ante lifetime utility explained by personality and cognitive traits
Openness to Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional Big-five Cognitive All
experience Stability in total ability Included
R2θ 0.149 0.026 0.008 0.070 0.001 0.236 0.229 0.518
Note: The table shows the percentage of variance in ex-ante lifetime utility (at age 15) accounted for when we allow
for heterogeneity only in one personality trait or cognitive ability (setting the values for other components equal to
the mean sample values).
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Table 21: The evolution of types by SES background
Benchmark model 50% college subsidy Compulsory schooling
Type I Type II Type III Type IV Type I Type II Type III Type IV Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Low SES
Age 15 0.240 0.196 0.340 0.224 0.240 0.196 0.340 0.224 0.240 0.196 0.340 0.224
Age 30 0.304 0.162 0.310 0.224 0.306 0.162 0.308 0.224 0.307 0.161 0.308 0.224
Change 0.064 -0.034 -0.030 0.000 0.065 -0.034 -0.031 0.000 0.067 -0.035 -0.031 0.000
Middle SES
Age 15 0.184 0.195 0.361 0.260 0.184 0.195 0.361 0.260 0.184 0.195 0.361 0.260
Age 30 0.245 0.180 0.321 0.254 0.245 0.181 0.320 0.254 0.250 0.178 0.316 0.256
Change 0.061 -0.015 -0.040 -0.006 0.061 -0.014 -0.041 -0.006 0.066 -0.018 -0.045 -0.004
High SES
Age 15 0.324 0.153 0.261 0.263 0.324 0.153 0.261 0.263 0.324 0.153 0.261 0.263
Age 30 0.356 0.165 0.232 0.247 0.358 0.164 0.232 0.246 0.360 0.163 0.231 0.247
Change 0.033 0.012 -0.029 -0.016 0.034 0.011 -0.029 -0.017 0.036 0.010 -0.030 -0.016
53
Table 22: The effect of educational policies on labor market outcomes by SES background
Model simulation Socio Economic Status (SES)
I II III Total
Percentage Finishing High school
Benchmark 89.4% 89.4% 89.4% 89.4%
50% college subsidy 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Compulsory senior secondary school 10.6% 10.3% 4.3% 8.1%
Percentage College Graduates
Benchmark 35.1% 36.3% 47.9% 40.5%
50% college subsidy 12.8% 11.9% 12.0% 12.2%
Compulsory senior secondary school 1.4% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2%
Education Years
Benchmark 13.980 14.021 14.844 14.328
50% college subsidy 0.484 0.486 0.482 0.484
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.256 0.219 0.126 0.193
Annual Earnings (for workers)
Benchmark 76,047 72,764 82,644 77,487
50% college subsidy 1,836.9 2,357.7 2,137.1 2,142.1
Compulsory senior secondary school 1,171.7 984.26 705.83 908.67
Fraction Blue Collar (%)
Benchmark 29.1% 33.7% 27.1% 30.0%
50% college subsidy -1.8% -2.9% -3.1% -2.7%
Compulsory senior secondary school -0.9% -0.7% -0.5% -0.7%
Fraction White Collar (%)
Benchmark 60.0% 55.6% 66.4% 60.8%
50% college subsidy 2.3% 3.1% 3.3% 3.0%
Compulsory senior secondary school 1.7% 1.5% 0.8% 1.3%
Utility Gain(Unit: AU$10,000)
Benchmark 82.541 83.092 89.841 85.556
50% college subsidy 0.725 0.752 0.988 0.836
Compulsory senior secondary school -0.689 -0.689 -0.447 -0.596
Note: The rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” show the deviations from
baseline values under the two separate policy experiments.
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Table 23: The effect of educational policies on personality traits by SES background
Personality Traits at age 30 Socio Economic Status (SES)
Model simulation I II III Total
Openness to Experience
Benchmark 4.242 4.364 4.565 4.411
50% college subsidy 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006
Conscientiousness
Benchmark 4.939 4.944 4.980 4.956
50% college subsidy 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005
Extraversion
Benchmark 4.373 4.440 4.488 4.442
50% college subsidy 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004
Agreeableness
Benchmark 5.090 5.126 5.212 5.150
50% college subsidy -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
Compulsory senior secondary school -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
Emotional Stability
Benchmark 5.006 5.051 5.074 5.049
50% college subsidy 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.023
Compulsory senior secondary school 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.012
Note: The rows labeled “50% college subsidy” and “compulsory senior secondary school” show the deviations from
baseline values under the two policy experiments. The calculation is based on model simulations of personality traits
at age of 30.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Work status and college attendance by age(% of the same age cohort)
Figure 2. Average annual earnings by Occupation over the life-cycle
Figure 3. The scores of “big five” personality traits over time
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Figures
Figure 1: Work status and college attendance by age(% of the same age cohort)
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Note: This figure shows the fractions of four choices (schooling, blue collar, white collar, home staying) over the age
cohort (15-44). Data source: HILDA data, 2001-2013.
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Figure 2: Average annual earnings by Occupation over the life-cycle
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Note: this figure shows the average annul earnings of blue collar workers and white collar workers within each age
cohort (18-44). Data source: HILDA data, 2001-2013.
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Figure 3: The scores of “big five” personality traits over time
(a) Openness to experience
4
4
.4
4
.8
5
.2
5
.6
O
p
en
n
es
s
15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
Age
(b) Conscientiousness
4
4.
4
4.
8
5.
2
5.
6
C
o
n
sc
ie
n
ti
o
u
sn
es
s
15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
Age
(c) Extraversion
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Notes: This figure shows changes in the “big five” personality traits with age. The measures are based on
males age 15-44 who report their personality traits in wave 13, HILDA.
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Figure 4: The probability of type changing by age
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Figure 5: The comparison of choice distribution and earning profile between real data and model simulations
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(e)Mean of log earning in blue-collar job
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(f)Mean of log earning in white-collar job
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Note: this figure display the fraction of each choices and log earnings over life-time. Data in dashed lines
with cycle makers, simulations in dashed lines with star markers.
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Figure 6: Comparison of measured distributions and imputed distributions of personality traits
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(b) Imputed openness to experience
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(c) Measured conscientiousness
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(d) Imputed conscientiousness
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(e) Measured extraversion
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(f) Imputed extraversion
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(g) Measured agreeableness
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(h) Imputed agreeableness
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(i) Measured emotional stability
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(j) Imputed emotional stability
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Note: These figures compare the “big five” initial distribution for individuals for which it is observed (left panels) with the imputed
distributions (right panels). We test equality of the distributions using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The test p-values are reported on
the top of each figure. Data source: HILDA 2005, 2009 and 2013, Males age 15-44 whose personality traits are measured at least once.
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Figure 7: Average personality traits and cognitive ability by type
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Note: This radar chart provides a graphical depiction of the average levels of personality traits and cognition by
type. Each equi-angular spoke (“radii”) represents one dimension of personality traits. All values of personality traits
and cognitive score are standardized to be zero mean and unit standard deviation.
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Figure 8: How the type distribution changes with age
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